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From the Editor...
As I write this, you are deciding how to cast your vote in the November elections. I'm sure
your choices will be the right ones and that the newly elected will, in all cases, work for a
strong economy and an environment free from the effects of terrorism.

My students

(majoring in logistics and intermodal transportation) are often concerned, given events of
the past year, about their prospects for jobs as they graduate. The very good news for
them to this point is that demand for our graduates has shown no signs of softening. Our
industry has shown remarkable resilience under adverse conditions.
Reaction to the decision to skip a publication year in order to "catch up" with the issue date
has been extremely positive. I have not received a single complaint, and the number of
manuscripts submitted has increased significantly. As the number and quality of
manuscripts increase, maintaining the publication schedule becomes easier.
You will be pleased, I think, with the content of this issue. The lead article, by Jim Keebler,
begins with an excellent summary of the development of the U.S. transportation industry
by mode.

This sets the stage for his analysis of important trends affecting the

transportation of goods in the United States. The second article, by Charles Pettijohn,
Stephen Parker, and John Kent, provides an in-depth look at the relationship between
transportation salespeople and their customers. In their research, the authors identify a
number of salesperson traits that are attractive to buyers of transportation services. Both
sides can benefit from the results! Jim Johnson, Diane McClure, Kenneth Schneider, and
Donald Wood query owners and managers of short-line railroads about their relationships
with their Class-I counterparts in the third article of this issue. While the relationships
between the two are not always "harmonious," the markets they serve assure a long-term
need to work well together. They also identify what the short-line industry considers to
be some of the more important trends affecting the Class-I railroads. Dawna Rhoades
traces the development of the global air transportation industry in the beginning of the
fourth article. She also describes the nature of the world air transport market both before
September 11, 2001, and after. She concludes by offering several possible scenarios for
the future of the industry. In the final article of this issue, Hokey Min reexamines the issue
of driver turnover and its impact upon profitability of the U.S. trucking industry. His
research both supports previously published research in this important area and offers new
managerial insights as well. There you have it. Something for everyone. I hope you take
the time to read each of the articles in this issue.

Please remember that we cannot survive and continue to publish without reader support.
Join or renew your membership in Delta Nu Alpha International Transportation Fraternity
today and subscribe to the Journal of Transportation Management Remember, if you join
DNA at the Gold level, a subscription to the JTM\s included in your membership! Share
this issue with a colleague and encourage him/her to subscribe today!
Jerry W. Wilson, Editor
Journal of Transportation Management

Georgia Southern University
Southern Center for Logistics and Intermodal Transportation
P.O. Box 8152
Statesboro, GA 30460-8152
(912) 681-0257

(912) 681-0710 FAX

jwwilson@gasou.edu
Stephen M. Rutner, Senior Associate Editor
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srutner@walton.uark.edu
Karl Manrodt, Associate Editor
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Soonhong Min, Associate Editor
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And visit our web sites:
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TRENDS IN THE TRANSPORTATION
OF GOODS IN THE U.S.
James S. Keebler
St. Cloud State University

ABSTRACT
This article describes the development and growth of various modes of transportation in the
United States and recent trends in the length, size and value of domestic shipments. Changes
in the transportation of goods in the United States are being driven largely by four
factors—the shift toward a digital economy, the growth of third-party logistics providers,
globalism, and the application of new technologies. Finally, this paper looks at emerging
forms of supply chain integration and operation.

INTRODUCTION
Many factors affect the performance of the
transportation system: accessibility, safety,
environmental restraints, input costs, energy
efficiency, capacity-to-demand ratios, reliability,
travel time and delay, goods damage, and a host
of other variables. The choice of mode used in
transporting goods is largely based on desired
trade-off between speed and cost. Discernable
shifts in modal choices have been occurring. For
some time, domestic truck transportation has
been the dominant mode in value of shipments
and tons shipped. Recently, motor carriage has
eclipsed rail as the leader in the category of tonmiles shipped.
Goods and raw materials shipped to factories
and wholesale and retail outlets throughout the
nation generated almost 2.7 trillion ton-miles in
1997 compared with 2.4 trillion ton-miles in 1993
(USDOC 1999). Most modes showed an increase
in ton-miles. Shipments by air (including those
involving truck and air) grew the most in ton-

miles (55.5 percent), followed by parcel, postal,
or courier services (36.8 percent), and truck (17.7
percent). Ton-miles by rail (including truck and
rail) increased by 8.5 percent and ton-miles by
water decreased by 3.8 percent.

BRIEF HISTORY OF
MODAL DEVELOPMENT
To better appreciate the roles currently played
by the various modes of domestic transportation,
it would be helpful to briefly review their origins
and growth patterns.

Development of Waterways
Before the American Revolution, much of the
trade and commerce of the thirteen colonies was
carried on small ships that sailed up and down
the Atlantic Coast. Early in the nineteenth
century, improvements were made along some of
the rivers leading to the Atlantic so that they
could carry waterborne commerce. By the 1850s,
much of the United States east of the Mississippi
Fall 2002
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River was served by an elaborate network of
barge canals. Many were constructed before the
railroads. Others were built later to compete
directly with the railroads.
Many of the
railroads’ business practices were aimed directly
at driving the competing waterway carriers out
of business. By the end of the nineteenth
century, domestic water transportation had
virtually disappeared, except on the Great
Lakes.

the west coast of the United States accounted for
42 percent of the value of U.S. waterborne trade
with other countries compared with only 24
percent in 1980. East coast ports’ share bv
value, however, declined from 41 percent to 38
percent over this period (remaining relatively
stable in the last 5 years), and the share of value
for Gulf ports also dropped from 33 percent to 18
percent (USDOC Census 1997, Table 1069;
USDOT MARAD 1998).

Starting in the 1930s, massive federal
improvements to the Tennessee and Mississippi
Rivers, which included dams for flood control
and power generation as well as locks for
passage of barges, combined with enforcement of
laws aimed at railroad predatory pricing
practices, inland waterway transportation began
to revive. Established in 1925 by Congress, the
Army Corp of Engineers continues to be the
agency that provides most of the federal
expenditures for river and harbor improvements.
In 1997, 563 million tons of cargo was moved by
water (USDOC Census FTD 1997). In 1997, 57
percent of domestic tons moved on the inland
waterways, 24 percent moved coastwise, and 11
percent moved on lakes (the rest was local and
intraterritorial traffic).
Lake and inland
waterway movement increased by 13 percent and
7 percent, respectively, over this period, while
coastwise movement declined by 19 percent
(USACE 1998).

Increased trade with Asian Pacific countries
between 1980 and 1997 helps explain this east to
west coast shift. The financial crisis impacting
several Asian economies, beginning in the second
half of 1997, caused a slight decrease in overall
merchandise trade by west coast ports. Between
1996 and 1997, the value of total international
trade by west coast ports decreased 1.5 percent
compared with a 0.4 percent decrease for east
coast ports. Because of the appreciation of the
U.S. dollar in relation to several Asian
currencies, imports through west coast ports
increased 3 percent between 1996 and 1997,
while exports declined 12 percent.

Port performance is typically measured by
annual cargo throughput. In 1997, 150 ports
handled more than 1 million tons of cargo, and
31 ports handled over 10 million tons. While
waterborne trade accounted for more than threequarters of the tonnage of U.S. international
trade in 1997, its share of the value of U.S. trade
declined from 62 percent in 1980 to 40 percent in
1997(USDOC Census 1994, Table 1062; USDOC
Census FTD 1997). Among the factors that
explain this decline are greater land trade with
Canada and Mexico and the demand for faster
delivery of high-value commodities, which has
increased air trade. In 1997, maritime ports on
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The majority of west coast waterborne trade
transits the ports of Long Beach and Los
Angeles. Long Beach is also the leading U.S. port
both by value and for containerized trade, as
measured by the number of 20-foot equivalent
units (TEUs) handled. Ini 997, $85 billion worth
of international trade passed through the port of
Long Beach, and the port handled 2.7 million
TEUs (USDOC Census FTD 1997). Other west
coast ports such as Los Angeles, Seattle, and
Tacoma are also important gateways for U.S.
trade with Asia. The port of New York/New
Jersey is the east coast leader in both the value
of trade ($68 billion) and in the number of
containers (1.7 million TEUs) handled in 1997.
Charleston and Norfolk are also major east coast
container ports. The importance of Gulf ports
(e.g., Houston and South Louisiana) in the trade
of bulk commodities and crude petroleum can be
seen from their listing as the top two U.S. ports
by tonnage.

Development of Railroads
The first railroad in the United States was the
Baltimore and Ohio (B&O), incorporated in 1827.
The next year construction was started, using
the standard English track gauge—which is still
used today—of 56.5 inches between rails. In
1830, the first steam engine operated over a
thirteen-mile stretch of B&O track.
The strength, speed, durability, and year-round
availability of the railroad (waterways often
freeze during winter) made it the dominant form
of transportation. Its growth was spectacular.
From 40 miles of track in 1840, railroads
expanded over 31,000 miles by the start of the
Civil War (Kirkland 1951). Trackage peaked a
hundred years later at 152,000 miles, dropping
to about 115,000 by 1990. Improved techno
logies, such as automatic couplers, air brakes,
and diesel-powered locomotives facilitated the
growth of railroads. In the decade between 1862
and 1872, Congress enacted several land-grant
programs, giving railroads free land, usually
alternating sections, each section a square mile
or 640 acres, in a checkerboard pattern for six
miles on each side of the track (Wood and
Johnson 1996). Land was granted to accelerate
westward development of railroads. However,
the railroads accepting the grants had to agree to
charge lower rates to the federal government for
carrying freight and passengers—military traffic
and personnel.
With the advent of the Interstate Highway
System in the 1950s, truckers gained a distinct
cost advantage over railroads, under the existing
system of regulated rates, on hauls up to 500-600
miles in length. However, we have seen a
resurgence of railroads since deregulation in
1980. Revenue ton-miles reached 1,349 billion in
1997, an increase of 47 percent since 1980,
although revenue-ton miles increased only 16
percent in the eastern United States, but
climbed to 68 percent in the western United
States (AAR 1998, p. 61).
Intermodal (trailer or container on flatcar) and
coal are the largest categories of rail traffic, each

accounting for approximately one-quarter of the
carloadings of the railroad industry. Intermodal
traffic increased from 3.1 million loadings in
1980 to 8.7 million in 1997 (AAR 1998). The
introduction of double stack container trains in
the early 1980s played a major role in this
growth. Since the late 1970s, when the Powder
River Basin opened in Wyoming, coal shipments
grew from 4.4 million carloads in 1978 to 6.7
million carloads in 1997, reflecting the increased
demand for low sulfur western coal by electric
utilities to comply with clean air standards (AAR
1998).
A combination of chemicals, motor
vehicles and equipment, and farm products
account for roughly 20 percent of rail traffic.

Development of Pipelines
In August 1859, close to Oil Creek, near
Titusville, Pennsylvania, Colonel Edwin Drake
drilled the first commercially successful oil well.
Both waterway and wagon transportation of oil
had limitations overcome by a dedicated
pipeline. Samuel Van Syckel built the first suc
cessful pipeline in 1865 (Johnson 1956). It
reached five miles from Oil Creek to the Oil
Creek Railroad. The pipe came in 15-foot
sections that had to be screwed together. It was
laid on the ground, although in some areas it
was buried below the level reached by plowing.
With three steam-powered pumps, it was able to
transport 80 barrels, or 3,360 gallons, per hour.
It could move as much as 300 teamsters could
transport in a day.
At first, railroads did not object to pipelines,
because they were relatively short—less than ten
miles—and were primarily used to bring oil to
the railroad collection points. The first trunk
line, from Bear Creek, Pennsylvania to
Pittsburgh was six inches in diameter and
transported 10,000 barrels per day over its 108mile length (Johnson 1956).
The emergence of John D. Rockefeller’s Standard
Oil Company in the 1870s triggered a war for
control of both oil and natural gas pipelines. By
1890, Standard had a virtual monopoly on
pipeline transportation. Today there are over
Fall 2002
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half-a-million miles of pipeline in the United
States, working with minimum labor and risk 24
hours a day, seven days a week, transporting
crude and refined oil, natural gas, slurry, and
other commodities. The Trans-Alaska Pipeline
is the largest diameter pipeline in the United
States at 48 inches.
Development of Trucking
In 1896 the first self-propelled trucks began
appearing in the United States. By 1898 a
limited amount of competition was present
among the several manufacturers of “motor
delivery wagons.” By 1902 the horse versus
truck controversy was in full bloom.
General Motors Truck Company advertised,
“During the next three months it will be no
unusual sight to see horses dropping dead on the
streets, having succumbed to the heat... The
beauty of the motor truck is that it is not
affected by the heat” (Karolevitz 1966). G.M.C.
issued full-page advertisements to illustrate this
point, showing ten different pictures of horses
dying in the streets, attended by their anguished
owners.
A later advertisement for trucks
stressed their economy over “Old Dobbin.” The
lead sentence read, “1 GMC, 1 Driver, Displaces
16 Horses, 4 Drivers, 4 Wagons” (Karolevitz
1966). By 1911 there were about 25,000 trucks
in operation.
Both the pursuit of Pancho Villa into Mexico in
1916 and World War I provided great stimuli to
the motor truck industry. As an indication of the
general acceptance of trucks after World War I,
335,000 trucks were produced in 1920. The
replacement of the wooden wheels and solid
rubber tires with steel wheels and pneumatic
tires enormously increased truck carrying
capacity, speed and smoothness of ride. In the
1920s trucks performed mainly drayage
operations to and from railroads. By 1925 about
2.5 million trucks were in operation. In the
1930s the industry developed intercity markets
and began to compete with the railroads.

4

Journal of Transportation Management

Trucking (for-hire and private) moves more of
the nation’s freight, whether measured by value,
tons, and ton-miles, than any other mode
(USDOC Census 1999).
In 1997, trucks
transported $5.0 trillion of freight, a 13 percent
increase over 1993 (in constant 1997 dollars).
Truck shipments accounted for 72 percent of the
total value of shipments in 1997. Measured by
value of shipment, trucking was followed by
parcel, postal, and courier services; rail; pipeline,
if crude oil is included; air; and water in 1997.
While the shipment value per ton increased
overall between 1993 and 1997, it decreased for
trucking from $755 to $690 per ton (in constant
1997 dollars). The average reflects the wide
range of commodities moved by truck—from
sand and gravel, coal, and grain to electronic
equipment and pharmaceuticals. Interestingly,
the average value per ton of rail shipments (as a
single mode) increased from $175 in 1993 to $210
in 1997 (USDOC Census 1997).

Development of Aviation
There was great interest in the development of
powered aircraft at the beginning of the
twentieth century. The first successful flight
was in late 1903 at Kitty Hawk, North Carolina.
Wilbur and Orville Wright, two brothers who
had a bicycle business in Dayton, Ohio,
accomplished this feat. Their first flight lasted
only a minute, but by 1905 the Wright brothers
were making flights lasting as long as thirty
minutes. In the early days of World War I,
aircraft were used primarily for observation.
Before the end of the war, aircraft were being
used as fighters and bombers. With government
subsidies to carry the mail, the domestic airline
industry began in the mid-1920s. The first U.S.
aircraft designed primarily to carry passengers
was the Ford Trimotor, introduced in 1926
(Woods and Johnson 1996). Because of the high
cost of air transportation, the airlines have not
been a major factor in commercial cargo
transport, except for selective high value,
perishable, or extremely time sensitive

TABLE 1
VALUE OF SHIPMENTS
Domestic and Export-Bound Freight Shipments Within the U.S.
1997
Value
Truck
PPC
Other/Unk
Rail
Air
Pipeline
Water
Total

4,982
856
368
320
229
113
76
6,944

1997 % of
Total Value

1997 vs. 1993
Growth in Value (%)

71.7
12.3
5.3
4.6
3.3
1.6
1.1
100.0

13.1
51.9
7.9
29.2
64.7
26.3
23.1
18.8

Value of Shipments in SBillions, inflation-adjusted
PPC = Parcel, postal, and courier
Source:
U.S. Department of Transportation, Bureau of Transportation Statistics, 1997 Commodity Flow
Survey: United States, EC97TCF-US (Washington DC: 1999)

TABLE 2
TONS SHIPPED
Domestic and Export-Bound Freight Shipments Within the U.S.
1997
Tons
Truck
Rail
Other/Unk
Pipeline
Water
PPC
Air
Total

7,700
1,550
630
618
563
24
4
11,089

1997 % of
Total Tons
69.4
14.0
5.7
5.6
5.1
0.2
0.0
69.4

1997 vs. 1993
Growth in Tons (%)
20.6
0.4
-15.7
27.8
11.5
25.4
42.6
14.5

Tons of Shipments in Millions
PPC = Parcel, postal, and courier
Source:
U.S. Department of Transportation, Bureau of Transportation Statistics, 1997 Commodity Flow
Survey: United States, EC97TCF-US (Washington DC: 1999)
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TABLE 3
TON-MILES SHIPPED
Domestic and Export-Bound Freight Shipments Within the U.S.
1997
Tons-Miles
Truck
Rail
Water
Pipeline
Other/Unk
PPC
Air
Total
(*1)
(*2)
Source:

1,024
1,022
262
(*1)
329
18
6
2,661

1997 % of
Total

1997 vs. 1993
Growth (%)

38.5
38.4
9.8
(*1)
12.4
0.7
0.2
100.0

17.7
8.5
-3.8
(*1), (*2)
(*2)
36.8
55.5
9.9

CFS data restated in December 1999 to exclude crude oil shipments by pipeline
Category component changed in 1997 survey not comparable to 1993 survey
U.S. Department of Transportation, Bureau of Transportation Statistics, 1997 Commodity Flow
Survey: United States, EC97TCF-US (Washington DC: 1999)

commodities. There are a few all-cargo airlines,
like FedEx, UPS, and DHL. They principally
handle overnight delivery of small packages.
Otherwise air cargoes move on scheduled
passenger aircraft operated by Northwest,
United, Delta, American, and others. Usually
shipments need to originate and terminate in
trucks, making airlines a speedier alternative to
truck transportation only over long distances.

leading gateway for shipments into and out of
the United States by all modes, accounting for
over $89 billion in 1997 (USI)OC Census 1997).
Following JFK in shipment volume were the
airports of Chicago, Los Angeles, and San
Francisco.

CHANGING SHIPMENT CATEGORIES
Parcels, Postal and Courier Shipments

Airfreight moves both by all-cargo carriers and
carriers that transport passengers. Between
1980 and 1997, airfreight’s share of the value of
U.S. international merchandise trade increased
from 16 percent to nearly 28 percent (USDOT
BTS 1998). Commodities that move by air tend
to be high in value—air’s share of U.S. trade by
weight was less than 1 percent in 1997. Western
European and Asian Pacific countries dominate
airfreight to and from the United States. The
top three countries by value of airfreight with
the United States are Japan, the United
Kingdom, and Singapore. New York’s John F.
Kennedy (JFK) International Airport was the
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Business establishments in the United States
shipped much more commercial freight on the
nation’s transportation system in 1997 than in
1993, the two most recent years for which
comprehensive freight data are available
(USDOC Census 1997). While parcel, postal and
courier shipments comprised a very small
amount of the 11 billion tons moved in 1997, only
two-tenths of a percent or 24 million tons, these
shipments represented over 12% of the nearly $8
trillion in total value of shipments. This equates
to $2.4 billion per day in value of shipments in
this category. This category of shipment grew

significantly between 1993 and 1997: 52% in
value of shipments, 25% in tons, and over 36% in
ton-miles (USDOC Census 1997). The pheno
menal growth in this category is likely due to
Internet-based sales that are delivered by U.S.
mail, and companies like Federal Express and
UPS.

Multimodal Shipments
Multimodal transportation (shipments reported
as moving by more than one mode) increased
substantially in value between 1993 and 1997
from $932 billion to $1.2 trillion (in constant
1997 dollars), or 31% (USDOC 1999). Multi
modal shipments declined in both tons and tonmiles by 14% and 2%, respectively. These
shipments are typically international shipments.
Air, land, and water modes are all-important in
transporting goods in U.S. international trade.
The leading gateway overall in 1997 was JFK
International Airport in New York with $89
billion of activity (USDOT BTS 1998). This was
followed by the water port of Long Beach,
California, which handled $85 billion worth of
shipments, and Detroit, Michigan, a land
gateway with $83 billion worth of shipments in
1997 (USDOT BTS 1998). Changes in the mix of
commodities traded internationally, geographic
shifts in centers of production, global trade
patterns, and many other factors will continue to
affect these gateways as well as the movement of
international trade shipments to, from, and
within the United States.

Local Versus Long-Haul Freight
Freight shipments can be categorized as local
(less than 100 miles), intra-regional (between
100 and 1,000 miles), and interregional (over
1,000 miles). In 1997, local shipments consti
tuted nearly 67 percent of the weight (7.7 billion
tons), 40 percent of the value ($3 trillion), but
only 9 percent of the ton-miles (254 billion) of all
U.S. shipments, about the same proportion of the
value, tons, and ton-miles identified in 1993
(USDOT BTS 1998).

Intra-regional shipments in 1997 accounted for
45 percent of the value of goods shipments ($3.4
trillion), 29 percent of the tons (3.3 billion tons),
and 62 percent of the ton-miles (1.7 trillion).
Interregional shipments accounted for a
relatively small proportion of the total tonnage
(4.4 percent in 1997), but they have had a large
impact on the U.S. transportation system and
the tonnage of such shipments has grown
rapidly. In 1997, longer haul shipments
accounted for 29 percent of the ton-miles, about
the same proportion as in 1993. Nevertheless,
the tonnage moving such long distances grew
about 40 percent, with value increasing nearly
30 percent in real terms (USDOT BTS 1998).

Shipments of Major Commodities
Merchandise in the category “electronic, other
electrical equipment and components, and office
equipment” accounted for the highest dollar
value ($925 billion) of U.S. shipments in 1997,
followed by motorized and other vehicles
(including parts); textiles, leather, and articles of
textiles and leather; and miscellaneous
manufactured products (USDOT BTS 1998). It
should be noted that the Department of
Transportation discontinued reporting crude oil
shipments and does not include values or
volumes of crude oil shipments made by pipeline
or water in its reports.
As for total tonnage shipped, the top commodity
groups were gravel and crushed stone (1.8 billion
tons), coal and coal products, gasoline and
aviation fuel, and nonmetallic mineral products.
Although gravel and crushed stone accounted for
16 percent of total tons, shipments in this
category accounted for less than 1 percent of the
value and about 4 percent of the ton-miles of all
shipments, impacting mostly local transporta
tion.
The transportation of coal generated the most
ton-miles (520 billion), followed by cereal grains,
gasoline and aviation fuel, and prepared
foodstuffs. Coal produced the most ton-miles
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because, unlike gravel and stone, which move
mostly in local areas, coal is often shipped long
distances. Coal mined in Wyoming and Montana
is transported nationwide. In 1997, a ton of coal
was shipped 416 miles on average, compared
with 55 miles for a ton of gravel and crushed
stone (USDOT BTS 1998).

Shipment Size
Freight shipments are divided into several
weight categories: less than 100 pounds, 100 to
999 pounds, 1,000 to 49,999 pounds, and over
50,000 pounds. In 1997, the value of U.S.
shipments under 100 pounds exceeded $1.1
trillion, 37 percent greater than in 1993 (USDOC
Census 1997). Growth in parcel, postal, and
courier services and an increase in just-in-time
production and distribution systems are partly
responsible for this rise in smaller size
shipments. Shipments of less than 100 pounds
are often high-value, time-sensitive commodities
transported by truck and air intermodal
combinations, or by truck alone. In 1997, such
small-size shipments accounted for 15 percent of
the value of shipments, little different from the
13 percent in 1993 (USDOT BTS 1998).

values. The power of the Internet lies in its
capability to connect companies, their trading
partners and consumers easily, quickly and
inexpensively. The impact of the Internet on the
supply chain is nothing less than profound in its
contribution to improved planning, improved
asset management, shorter cycle times, tailored
product positioning, and customer service.
Adoption of the new technologies that enable this
capability has been at a remarkably fast rate.
The concepts of aggregation of purchases,
inventories, orders and shipments and slower
cycle times to achieve logistics economies are
being challenged by the e-commerce enabled
supply chain concepts of make-to-customized
order, transact in units of one or a few, and
complete the fulfillment within hours, not weeks.
This results in customer expectations of
“overnight deliveries,” and will shift truckload to
less-than-truckload deliveries and dramatically
increase the freight moved by parcel delivery
companies.

Large-size shipments (over 50,000 pounds)
accounted for nearly 66 percent of the ton-miles,
56 percent of tons shipped, but only 12 percent of
the value of shipments in 1997. The relative
share of large-size shipments fell slightly
between 1993 and 1997 in value, tons, and tonmiles (USDOC Census 1997).

Shifts in the U.S. economy toward more services
and high-value, low-weight products are
influencing the mix of commodities, even as
overall shipments increase. Such shifts affect
the average value by unit of weight of
commodities shipped (e.g., personal computers
have a much higher value per ton than lumber).
On average, a ton of goods shipped in 1997 was
valued at $580, a slight increase from $563 in
1993 (both in constant 1997 dollars) (USDOT
BTS 1998).

MAJOR INFLUENCING FACTORS

The Role of Third Party Logistics Providers

The Role of the Digital Economy
The real purpose of a supply chain is not to help
companies get rid of products in their inventories
but to help customers find and acquire them
efficiently. Electronic commerce (e-commerce)
has significantly changed the way companies “go
to market.” The Internet provides an oppor
tunity for supply chains to work 24 hours a day,
seven days a week, in all countries using the
language of the customer to effect an exchange of
8
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Companies have long recognized that it is to
their advantage to outsource functions and
activities that do not matter much from a
business perspective, such as the operation of
the company cafeteria and provision of janitorial
services.
Companies have expanded this
thinking to include logistics functions, believing
it is appropriate to outsource activities that some
other firm can do better than they can. The
providers of services for transportation

FIGURE 1
ABSORPTION RATES OF NEW
INFORMATION TECHNOLOGIES ARE ACCELERATING
The following is the time it took (or is taking) for these technologies to reach the 10 million customer
mark after being introduced to the mass market.

Pager

| 41 years

Telephone

38 years

Cable TV

25 years

Fax Machine

22 years

VCR

9 years

Cellular Phone

9 years

Personal Computer

7 years

CD-ROM Drive

6 years

Wireless Data Service
Netscape® Web Browser

6 years*
6 months**

*Based on a forecast through 1999
**38 million in 18 months
Sources:

USA Today, Info Tech, Pac Tel Cellular and Netscape Communications (Keebler et al., 1999)

management, warehousing, order handling and
other logistics activities are called third-party
logistics providers, or 3PL’s.
Third-party logistics providers enable firms to
achieve reduced operating costs and increased
revenues in new and existing markets (Keebler
and Durtsche 2001). 3PL’s provide firms an
opportunity to enhance their market value by
reducing a company’s ownership of assets, which
translates to a higher return on remaining assets
and greater return on stockholder investment.
3PL’s also bring to the relationship their
specialized expertise in managing logistics with

contemporary technology and systems. The
COO’s decision to outsource company logistics
operations to the 3PL is often justified solely on
the favorable difference between the more
efficient 3PL’s price for the services and the
firm’s higher costs of existing operations. The
chief marketing officer views the enhanced
services and distribution reach of 3PL’s in
existing and new markets as translating into
increased sales and better long-term
relationships with customers.
CFO’s are
delighted to see assets—property, plant, equip
ment, and even inventory—disappear from the
firm’s balance sheet, freeing up cash for more
Fall 2002
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productive uses, instantaneously and
“permanently” improving the company’s returns
on assets. CIO’s are often very pleased to have
access to the 3PL’s systems and technology
resources, avoiding the cost and trauma of
upgrading their own. Reliance on the 3PL
alliance frees up company employees to focus on
their core competencies, doing more of what they
are good at and less of what can be done better
by the 3PL. Chief logistics officers begin to
realize that ownership of resources is not
necessary to achieve control over the results.
Third-party logistics providers with sophis
ticated data base management systems and
competency in activity-based costing can secure
long-term alliances with their customers and
their trading partners. Firms value timely,
accurate, comprehensive, and actionable data
about the activities that constitute their sourcing
and fulfillment processes, whether it is used for
planning, scheduling, measurement, costing, or
pricing purposes. Successful third-party pro
viders supply this knowledge.
Under gain
sharing arrangements, the firm and its 3PL
partner can implement improvements that result
in lower costs and share the benefits on an
equitable basis.
There remains a great
opportunity for this alliance to involve the firm’s
trading partners in the gain sharing program.
Changes by suppliers and customers in how and
where the work gets done can produce additional
logistics savings that can be shared by all.
Third-party logistics providers are seen as key
facilitators of supply chain management.
The selection and integration of a capable 3PL
requires managerial skill in establishing and
maintaining trusting, long-term relationships.
It also requires a continued investment in the
success of each party, based on a strategic and
systemic perspective of the interdependencies
and potential of the alliance.
In today’s competitive market place what
distinguishes winners from losers is the ability
to differentiate themselves through their service
and product offerings. For many firms, the
service differentiation is accomplished by how
10
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well the logistics process is managed. To achieve
excellence in logistics, successful firms ensure
that the key logistics processes are aligned with
the firm’s business strategy and measured
against predetermined performance objectives.
Additionally, the top firms are jointly defining
the specifics of each measure with their trading
partners (customers / suppliers / 3PL’s) to create
a common understating of expectations. While
some firms are developing their measurement
capability internally, a number are turning to
3PL’s to support their needs. As focused service
providers, 3PL’s are ideally positioned to bring
the systems, process design, and managerial
expertise to aid in establishing and imple
menting a comprehensive logistics management
effort. The 3PL is also often in the position to
act as a catalyst for meaningful dialog between
trading partners to establish a level of service
performance that truly adds value.

The Role of Global Supply Chains
Changes in how and where goods are produced,
and increase in international trade, have
contributed to the rise in freight tonnage and
ton-miles over the past few years. For example,
the manufacture, assembly, and sale of a single
product may involve several different facilities
located hundreds or even thousands of miles
apart.
The importance of international trade to the U.S.
economy can be seen in the increased value of
U.S. merchandise trade in recent decades.
Between 1980 and 1997, the real-dollar value of
U.S. merchandise trade more than tripled, from
$496 billion to $1.7 trillion (in 1997 dollars). In
addition, the ratio of the value of U.S.
merchandise trade relative to U.S. GDP doubled
from about 11 percent in 1980 to 23 percent in
1997 (USDOC ITA 1999).
During the past two decades, changes can be
seen in the geography of trade. Trade with
Asian Pacific countries grew greatly. In 1997,
five Asian countries were among the top-10 U.S.
trading partners, despite a slight downturn in
trade in the second half of 1997 related to

economic problems in the region. These five
countries accounted for 26 percent of overall U.S.
trade in 1997, up from 17 percent in 1980
(USDOC Census FTD 1997).
Canada and
Mexico were the first and third largest U.S.
trading partners in 1980 and in 1997. While the
rankings remained the same, the U.S. trade
relationship with these two countries deepened.
In 1980, Canada and Mexico together accounted
for 22 percent of all U.S. trade by value. By
1997, this had increased to over 30 percent
(USDOC Census FTD 1997). Canada accounts
for approximately 20 percent and Mexico 10
percent of U.S. merchandise trade. U.S. trade
with Mexico has grown more quickly than with
Canada, and in 1997 Mexico surpassed Japan as
the second largest market for U.S. merchandise
exports (although Mexico remained the third
largest trading partner overall). Between 1993
and 1997, trade with North American FTee Trade
Agreement (NAFTA) partners increased 62
percent in current dollars, from $293 billion to
$475 billion. During this same period, U.S. trade
with Mexico grew most rapidly, almost doubling
from $81 billion in 1993 to $157 billion in 1997
(USDOC 1998, table 1323; USDOC Census FTD
1997).

commodities include consumer electronics,
telecommunications equipment, and aircraft
equipment and parts.
In addition, crude
petroleum, natural gas, and petroleum products
are important U.S. imports from both Canada
and Mexico. Mexico is also a chief source of U.S.
imports of clothing and textiles, while paper
products, furniture, and wood products are
among leading U.S. imports from Canada.

Changes over the past two decades also occurred
in the commodities traded. Higher value manu
factured goods now dominate U.S. trade,
accounting for $1.3 trillion or 85 percent of the
value of all merchandise trade in 1997 (USDOC
ITA 1999). Of these goods, motor vehicles,
computers, telecommunications equipment, and
aircraft are among the top U.S. import and
export commodities by value. While the value of
manufactured goods increased as a share of U.S.
trade, the share of agricultural commodities
declined from 13 percent in 1980 to 6 percent in
1997. Mineral fuels accounted for approximately
6 percent of the value of U.S. trade in 1997,
primarily imports of crude petroleum and
petroleum products (USDOC ITA 1999).

Application of Technologies

In terms of commodities, motor vehicles and
motor vehicle parts and accessories dominate
trade between all of the North American
countries. Other leading North American trade

In their search for new markets and customers
as well as more favorable sources of supply and
production sites, U.S. companies have been
pursuing globalization strategies as a means of
insuring access to resources and growth in
revenues. Joint ventures and strategic alliances
with trading partners around the world are
characteristic today of major American
companies. Elimination of country tariffs and
quotas and simplification of trade documentation
have been pursued by the U.S. government and
trade organizations. Market defensive strategies
are being replaced by market prospecting
strategies where the goal is to establish sup
portive, interdependent business relationships
and influence emerging industries, technologies
and supply chains.

Technologies exist today that can be used to
create more effective and efficient supply chains.
Examples include bar coding, scanning, data
warehousing and data mining architectures and
software systems, and use of the Internet to
connect trading partners and customers.
Applications of radio frequency and computer
directed storage and handling systems, of
satellite supported ground positioning systems
(GPS) for tracking and expediting shipments,
and of point of sale and point of use capture of
demand data are examples of‘new’ technologies
being used. Progress toward improved supply
chain management does not appear to be limited
or propelled by available technology as much as
the capability and desire of management to
establish strategic, and mutually beneficial
multi-firm relationships.
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CONCLUSION
As the U. S. economy continues to grow, so does
the demand for transportation services. Truck
transportation is the dominant mode, accounting
for 69% of 1997 tonnage. The nearly 15% increase
in domestics tons shipped between 1993 and 1997
can be attributed to trucking, which grew by 20%
over the same period.
The way companies go to market, increasingly
moving smaller shipments faster to meet shorter
fulfillment cycle times, is having a visible impact
on the domestic transportation trends. Today,
Internet based catalogues offer everything from
consumer electronics, luxury goods, sporting gear,
freshly produced foods, prescription medicines,
and replacement parts. Demanding customers are
expecting overnight delivery of this Internet based
e-commerce. This can occur out of a network of
market-based distribution centers filled with
inventory, or more cheaply out of fewer fulfillment
hubs, requiring much less inventory, where
overnight delivery is still possible. Parcel express
companies, like Federal Express and UPS are
developing sophisticated new software for
customer order fulfillment and electronic
warehousing at strategic “pick and pack” hubs.
Orders placed today over the Internet can be
delivered anywhere in the US from locations in
Seattle, Memphis or Lexington. International
shipments can be cleared by customs
electronically before they land, overnight or the
next day, in the destination country. Pick up and
delivery carriers can be coordinated electronically
on both ends to schedule the quickest and least
expensive movements.
The supply chains of tomorrow will be supported
by virtual logistics networks where manufac
turers and their suppliers and customers, repair
vendors, delivery companies, and logistics service
providers will be connected electronically via
virtual data centers and web interfaces on the
Internet.
Internet based collaborative rela
tionships will provide enterprise-wide and supply
chain visibility for improved planning and
execution.
As we head into this new millennium, the
movement toward globalization, with emerging
12
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markets, cheaper supply sources, and new trading
partners, is compelling enterprises of all sizes to
build alliances and on-line commerce systems that
efficiently deliver products to customers while
providing a worldwide view of operations. Virtual
along with traditional organizations are de
veloping new strategies to track orders and react
to changes in real time in handling and trans
porting materials as they move across the supply
chain from originating suppliers to end
customers.
The goal is to electronically link the entire
forecasting, planning, sales, procurement,
production, delivery, freight payment and revenue
collection processes into one seamless flow of
information across national borders, time zones,
and differing languages, creating a global view of
the supply chain flows. Transportation and
fulfillment providers, including Federal Express,
UPS, Sea Land, DHL and SkyWay, are opening
up their systems allowing e-commerce vendors to
access, track, and communicate logistics informa
tion in a variety of innovative ways. Web casting
and publish/subscribe techniques allow all
interested parties to be alerted to situations
requiring their attention. This includes changes
in customer demand, order revisions and
cancellations, adjustments in quantity and/or
locations for deliveries in progress, customs
clearance problems, and on-time delivery or
installation issues.
An integrated, virtual
solution can diagnose when a critical piece of
equipment is about to fail, can tell when a hub is
short of replacement or repair parts, and also can
locate the source of the problem, whether it is due
to an enroute delivery, warehouse situation, or
change in the scope of an order.
These new Internet-based solutions have the
potential to all but eliminate the strategic role of
distribution centers for replacement parts,
putting the emphasis on moving information, not
parts. This new capability provides for dynamic
decision opportunities, or fixing problems before
they arise.
Automated online personalities that emulate hu
man customer service representatives will become
widespread in the Internet at a much lower cost
than traditional support functions. These web-

based “virtual reps” will be able to react to
customer inquiries and handle frequently asked
questions twenty-four hours a day, seven days a
week, in any language.
Internet-based, extra enterprise-wide e-commerce applications are part of a fundamental shift
in how computing is being applied to the business
of managing logistics across the trading land
scape. New strategies and software to support

those strategies are being developed, tested and
implemented in order to help companies find the
best balance between demand opportunities and
supply constraints while enabling effective, con
trolled logistics execution. As trading partners
work together to improve the overall performance
of their supply chain, they are beginning to
discover the solution might just be a virtual
reality.
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ABSTRACT
The research reported in this manuscript provides several insights regarding the specific
behaviors and traits of transportation salespersons as sought by a sample of shippers.
Shippers in both manufacturing and non-manufacturing industries were asked to evaluate
the importance of 30 potential salesperson characteristics. Overall, dependability, ethical
conduct, honesty, provision of regular service, and solution selling were ranked as the most
important (“must have”) characteristics. In addition to the overall rankings, t-tests were used
to compare the manufacturing and non-manufacturing groups and ANOVA tests were used
to compare the responses of shippers which were grouped by number of contacts from
salespersons.
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INTRODUCTION
What are the critical traits and behaviors that a
salesperson should exhibit in his/her interre
lationships with various customer groups?
According to an interview reported in Sales and
Marketing Management magazine, buyers seek
salespeople who “exude integrity’ (honest and
trustworthy), who know their product,
applications and industry (something of an
expert), who listen and custom design a solution,
conduct follow-up activities in a timely fashion,
work for the benefit of both the buying and
selling organizations, and who are excellent
communicators (Kaydo 2000). Kaydo further
contends that the common mistakes salespeople
make include: not being knowledgeable of their
product, failing to evaluate and understand the
company with which they are dealing, focusing
only on price, not following through on
commitments, not making appointments, not
having an agenda, and not working to fit into the
consuming firm’s priorities. Based on the
anecdotal evidence reported, it would seem that
the key qualitites of a “good” salesperson are:
honesty, knowledge, ability to adapt to the
customer’s situation, being dependable, allowing
and encouraging customer input, and providing
true solutions.
As Garver and Mentzer (2000) point out, in the
area of business logistics, the sales “interface is
becoming increasingly important.” Thus, it
would seem that a listing of the traits and
behaviors that are desired by buyers could be
important for numerous reasons.
First, one
could reasonably assume that salespeople who
possess the traits/behaviors most desired by
their buyers would also be the ones with whom
buyers prefer to work and interact. It could then
be argued that this preference should result in
more sales, higher profits, greater customer
satisfaction, etc. Based on this premise, an
identification of traits/behaviors of salespeople
could also be valuable to firms as they'engage in
the selection process. For example, if product
knowledge is identified as one of the buyer’s
most critical factors, then selection decisions
may be predicated upon the applicant’s ability
16
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and/or skills in understanding the product.
Third, the listing of critical skills may also be
useful in the development of sales training and
development programs. If, as stated previously
(Kaydo 2000), the ability to custom design a
solution is a critical behavior, then firms should
train their sales forces in developing custom
designed solutions. Finally, the development of
a list of key skills/traits of salespeople may also
be useful in the development of performance
appraisal programs. It would seem logical that
salespeople be evaluated on criteria that are
critical to their buyers. Using this logic, one
might argue that salespeople should be assessed
on their ability to communicate solutions to their
buyers.
However, while the information provided from
interviews such as the one from Sales and
Marketing Management (Kaydo 2000) is
insightful, valuable, and may be useful in the
selection, training, and evaluating of salespeople,
it should be recognized that the definition and
identification of “good” selling behavior/traits is
probably largely dependent upon the perceptions
and positions of the person listing the traits.
One might find that different individuals
identify different behaviors/traits as being
critical to a sales position. Correspondingly,
individuals in various industries may identify
unique behaviors/traits as being important in
their industries. Further, designing selection,
training, and evaluation programs on the basis
of a half a dozen interviews would seem tenuous.
Based on these limitations, the purpose of this
research is to evaluate the importance of
alternative salesperson traits and behaviors
from the perspectives of professional buyers in
one selected industry, the transportation
industry. The findings of this research may be
valuable to firms that target this industry for
their personal selling efforts. These organiza
tions may use these findings to guide their sales
force selection, training, and evaluation
processes. Thus, businesses that are empha
sizing personal selling as a significant portion of
their promotional mixes may be better able to
identify the critical factors that influence the
effectiveness of their selling efforts and

consequently improve their sales results by
implementing the findings of this study.

communication skills, (5.1), selling skills (4.7),
initiative (4.8), and appearance (4.9).

RELATED LITERATURE

A second method that may be used to identify
the critical salesperson traits/behaviors that
relate to successful selling would entail an
assessment of sales training topics. Firms that
are interested in facilitating successful perfor
mance by their sales forces would logically
provide training in those areas most closely
aligned with sales success. Most research per
taining to training topics contends that the
following topics are important: selling
techniques, product knowledge, negotiation
skills, interviewing, and competitive knowledge
(Chonko, Tanner and Weeks 1993; Del Gaizo
1987; Kerr and Burzynski 1988). Others argue
that the training focus should be more
exclusively on selling skills and topics such as
self-management and motivation, and sales
planning (Johnson 1990; Smith 1991). In one
study, salespeople were asked to identify the
critical topics that should be included in a sales
training program. The percentage with which
certain topics were rated as being important by
salespeople, which could also be perceived as
being critical determinants of an effective sales
presentation, included the presentation (88.3%),
sales follow-up (80%), ethics (71.7%), relation
ship selling (63.3%), professionalism (60.6%),
product knowledge (58.3%), and adaptability
(48.3%) (Parker, Pettijohn, and Luke 1996).

An assessment of the skills and traits required
for successful selling can be made from
numerous vantage points. From one perspective,
it would seem that performance appraisal
criteria would emphasize an evaluation of the
skills/behaviors that would be required for
success in the sales profession. This viewpoint
might argue that salespeople should be “graded”
on criteria that relate to successful performance.
Jackson, Schlacter and Wolfe (1995) identified
numerous criteria that they found were used to
assess salesperson performance. Among these
criteria were qualitative criteria (sometimes
referred to as input criteria) which relate to the
skills that may help a salesperson succeed. The
results of their research provided the percentage
with which specific skills were used by managers
in their evaluations of salesperson performance.
These sales managers stated that the following
skills were used in their evaluations of
salesperson performance: communication (88%),
product knowledge (85%), attitude (82%), sales
skills (79%), initiative (76%), appearance (image)
(75%), competitive knowledge (71%), enthusiasm
(66%), time management (63%), motivation
(61%), and ethical behavior (59%). In a similar
study, the importance of various criteria were
evaluated (Taylor, Pettijohn and Pettijohn 1999).
In terms of the traits/behaviors of salespeople,
the results of this study indicated that sales
managers believed that the most important
factors (7 = most important, 1 = least important)
were product knowledge (4.8), attitude (4.4),
communication skills, (4.3), selling skills (4.2),
initiative (3.6), and appearance (3.5). However,
it may be noted that the Taylor, Pettijohn and
Pettijohn (1999) study also found some
differences in the perceptions of salespeople and
their managers in terms of the qualitative
criteria that should be emphasized in
performance appraisals. The results indicated
that salespeople rated the importance of the
salesperson behaviors/traits in the following
manner: product knowledge (5.2), attitude (5.3),

A third method that may be used in identifying
critical salesperson behaviors might entail
asking salespeople to rate the importance of
alternative behaviors. One study which evalu
ated the importance of alternative behaviors did
so by examining alternative tactics in selling,
from the prospecting stage to closing (Hite and
Bellizzi 1985). The two topical areas that seem
to hold the most relevance for the present study
include the “presentation” and the “follow-up”
sections. In the presentation section, industrial
salespeople provided the following importance
ratings (5 = most important) for various sales
behaviors/traits: develop a “tailored” sales
presentation (4.33), ask questions (4.26), help
the prospect visualize the product offering (4.11),
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speak the prospect’s language (4.09), and
demonstrate (4.09). With regard to the follow-up
section of the sales encounter, industrial
salespeople provided the following importance
ratings: periodic follow-up of customer satis
faction (4.54), customer training (4.37), serving
as a consultant (4.22), and reassuring the
customer (4.18).
Chonko, Caballero, and
Lumpkin (1990), used a scale to assess the
salesperson’s behavior in nineteen critical
dimensions of retail sales behavior. Salespeople
in this study were graded on aspects such as
courtesy, customer focus, listening, product
knowledge, availability, willingness to assist, use
of questions, attempts to learn about he
customer’s needs, use of visualization techniques
in the presentation, demonstration skills,
willingness to customize solutions, and his/her
general attitude.
Moncrief (1986) conducted an analysis of critical
sales behaviors by asking industrial salespeople
what they did on their jobs. Of interest to the
present research, the findings identified the
following behaviors: select products for sales
calls, prepare sales presentations, introduce new
products, help clients plan, correct orders,
handle shipment problems, learn about product
by working with technicians, make deliveries,
train customers, provide feedback to employer,
receive feedback from clients, read trade
publications, provide technical information, and
conduct social activities with buyers. A more
recent analysis identified “critical success
factors” in sales by identifying behaviors that
separated “top” sales performers from the
“bottom” performers (Dwyer, Hill and Martin
2000). Findings relevant to the present analysis
showed that “helping the prospect visualize the
benefits” was a behavior engaged in by top
performing salespeople.
Using “partially
standardized sales presentations” was a behavior
engaged in by the low performing salespeople.
The research concluded that top performing
salespeople tended to use a more personal and
customer-oriented approach to selling. These top
performers also engaged in more “customized”
presentations that focused on the buyer’s needs.
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Conversely, the low performing salespeople
tended to less personal methods for identifying
and satisfying needs. The research argues that
“low performers” focus on product benefits and
do little to alter their presentations to the
specific customer needs in a given situation
(Dwyer, Hill and Martin 2000). In a similar vein,
qualitative research indicates that logistics
buyers are seeking salespeople who have
expertise in several areas, including in their
product, their firms’ logistics systems and in
their buyers' businesses and operations.
Further, buyers in this study indicated that their
salespeople should be able to handle logistical
procedures and understand their buyers’ needs.
Buyers were also described as desiring more of a
“partnership relationship” with their sales
representatives (Carver and Mentzer 2000).
It may be noticed that while some degree of
overlap exists between the traits/behaviors
described by buyers and sellers as being critical,
the training topics included in the programs
discussed, and the ways in which sales
representatives are evaluated, some differences
exist. One could argue that some differences
should always exist, as many aspects of a
salesperson’s job may not be a portion of the
buyer-seller dyad. However, it would also seem
reasonable to assume that the behaviors that are
deemed critical by the buyer would be topics that
should also be emphasized in a sales training
program and correspondingly in the performance
review process. Reconciling these positions
requires more than the anecdotal evidence
garnered from an interview with six buyers
(Kaydo 2000). In fact, it could be argued that an
identification of salesperson traits that seem
most significant to buyers should be completed
through some form of empirical analysis. The
purpose of this research is to engage in this
process by surveying professional buyers of
shipping services and identifying the relative
levels of importance of the skills/traits that are
possessed by the salespeople that contact them
and their employers. As stated by Garver and
Mentzer (2000), limited research has evaluated
the relationship between logistics salespeople

and their customers. This type of research may
be valuable not only in the development and
implementation of sales training programs, but
also in the salesperson recruitment and selection
processes. Indeed, an analysis of the buyers’
perspectives of the traits and behaviors of sales
people may provide the catalyst for evaluating
the effectiveness of both sales training programs
and individual salespeople.

located in the Midwest. The shipping companies
used in this study included firms involved in
retail, manufacturing, services, and specialty
providers. Of the 518 questionnaires sent, seven
were returned as being undeliverable, thereby
reducing the sample size to 511 shippers. A total
of 114 usable questionnaires were returned
representing an overall response rate of 22.3
percent.

METHODOLOGY

RESULTS

Literature was reviewed to identify character
istics of successful salespeople in a wide variety
of industries. The results of the literature
review were used to construct questions relating
to salesperson characteristics which might be
required of salespeople in the transportation and
logistics industry. The reviewed research
suggested that three categories of character
istics exist.
First, intrinsic characteristics,
which include concepts such as self-motivation,
knowledge of one’s goals, perseverance, a desire
for continual training, and a willingness to take
risks. Second, customer oriented skills, including
characteristics such as the ability to listen, the
ability to sell solutions, anticipation of the
customer’s needs, and building and improving
customer relations. Third, personal selling char
acteristics, which include approach and
involvement techniques, qualifying customers,
presentation techniques, overcoming objections,
and closing techniques.

The results of this study are presented by
evaluating mean responses to a set of 30
salesperson characteristics. While other studies
have examined salesperson characteristics in a
variety of industries, this study examines these
traits from the perception of shippers presently
using transportation services. The respondents
consisted of 33 non-manufacturing firms, 79
manufacturing firms, and two respondents
opting not to respond to this question.
Respondents from the two types of companies
were first asked to provide information on the
number of transportation sales forces that
contact their company on a regular basis. The
response to this inquiry is shown in Table 1.

The final questionnaire used in this study
consisted of thirty questions covering the three
previously mentioned categories, as well as
several questions used for developing a
demographic profile of the respondents.
Respondents were asked to rate the importance
of each characteristic on a five point Likert type
scale with 1 representing “not important” and 5
representing “must possess.” The questionnaire
was then sent to a sample of shipping firms for
evaluation and feedback purposes. Based on this
feedback, the questionnaire was revised and
then mailed to a list of 518 companies that used
truckload shipping services.
This list was
provided by a major transportation company

TABLE 1
SALES FORCE CONTACT

Type of Company

Number of
Contacts
0-20

21-50

51+

Non-Manufacturing Firms

14

6

12

Manufacturing Firms

35

25

18

Total Contacts

49

31

30

Table 1 shows that 49 of the responding firms
(42% of non-manufacturing respondents and 44%
of manufacturing respondents) have regular
contact with up to 20 firms. Higher numbers of
contacts are reported by 31 firms (18% of non
manufacturing respondents and 32% of
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manufacturing respondents) who report regular
contact with 21-50 firms and 30 firms (36% of
non-manufacturing respondents and 23% of
manufacturing respondents) reporting over 50
regular contacts with various sales forces. Based
upon these responses, it seems reasonable to
conclude that the companies involved in this
study have regular contact with a variety of
different types of salespeople in their daily
operations.
The respondents were asked to examine the list
of thirty salesperson behaviors/traits, derived
from the process described in the methodology,
and to rate the relative importance of each
behavior/trait using a Likert-type scale anchored
with 1 representing “not important” and 5
representing “must possess.” Overall mean
scores for each of the characteristics were then
ranked in descending order from the highest
level of importance (“must have”) to the lowest
level of importance (“not important”) and are
shown in Table 2. Additionally, Table 2 reports
the mean scores for each characteristic as
reported by both non-manufacturing and
manufacturing respondents. These responses
were then examined for significant differences
between the manufacturing and non
manufacturing groupings.
The data reported in Table 2 indicate that the
respondents regarded 13 of the characteristics
(based on mean scores of at least 4.0) as being of
“importance” for a salesperson to possess, while
the remaining 17 characteristics, with reported
mean scores of below 4.0, were found to fall into
the category of being “beneficial” characteristics
for a salesperson to possess. When these char
acteristics are examined based upon the type of
responding firm, the levels of importance varied
slightly with non-manufacturing firms reporting
14 characteristics to be “important” and
manufacturing firms reporting 11 characteristics
as being “important” to the success of the
salesperson.
Four of the characteristics,
Dependability of Salesperson (4.62), Ethical
Conduct (4.54), Honest (4.53), and Provides
Regular Service (4.44), were rated higher than
the remaining characteristics. A sales manager
20
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may well draw the conclusion that these four
characteristics would be critical characteristics
for their salespeople to exhibit when dealing
with either non-manufacturing or manufac
turing firms.
Each characteristic was then examined through
the use of t-tests to determine whether
significant differences existed between non
manufacturing and manufacturing firms in
terms of the importance placed on each
characteristic. Table 2 reveals that six of the 30
characteristics (Dependability, Knowledge of
Operations, Sincere, Expert on Offerings,
Contact with customer, and Opens Discussions)
were found to differ significantly, at the .05 level,
while four characteristics (Sells Solutions,
Flexibility, Risk Taker, and Persistent) were
found to be significantly different at the . 10 level.
These findings indicate that a sales manager
might be well-advised to consider the type of
clientele with which the sales force will be
interacting when designing sales training
programs.
While the mean score ratings for each char
acteristic are useful in determining the overall
perceived importance of each characteristic, they
may not tell the entire story. For example, when
each characteristic is examined in terms of the
number of companies contacting the respon
dents, the perceived importance of several of the
characteristics change. The mean scores for each
characteristic as it relates to the number of
contacts is shown in Table 3.
For those companies having 20 or fewer
organizations whose sales forces contact them,
18 of the 30 characteristics examined were rated
as being “important” characteristics, while those
companies reporting 21 to 50 contacts found only
6 of the characteristics to be considered
“important.” Of those companies reporting over
51 contacts, 15 of the characteristics were found
to be “important” for the sales person to possess.
The top four characteristics (Dependability,
Ethical Conduct, Honest, and Provides Regular
Service), which were rated high in the overall
ratings, were also rated high by each of the

TABLE 2
SALESPERSON CHARACTERISTICS
Characteristic

Overall Mean Score

Mean Score
Non-Mfg

t-test Significance

Mfg

Dependability of Salesperson

4.62

4.61

4.65

.019*

Ethical Conduct

4.54

4.52

4.54

.408

Honest

4.53

4.55

4.52

.409

Provides Regular Service

4.44

4.38

4.48

.231

Develops Solutions to Problems

4.09

4.03

4.12

.292

Communication Skills

4.09

4.00

4.13

.216

Sells Solutions

4.08

4.27

4.01

.056**

Listens to Customer Input

4.08

4.24

4.02

.079

Knowledgeable of Operations

4.06

4.27

3.96

.019*

Sincere

4.06

4.30

3.96

.008*

Expert on Product Offerings

4.05

4.33

3.92

.004*

Tailored Presentation

4.05

3.94

4.10

.395

Flexibility in Customizing Services

4.04

4.18

3.97

.076**

Resolves Concerns

3.98

3.94

4.00

.348

Maintains Contact with Customer

3.98

3.79

4.06

.005*

Self-Confident

3.98

4.00

3.95

.366

Positive Outlook

3.88

3.94

3.85

.263

Motivation or Drive

3.87

3.97

3.82

.185

Identify Needs

3.86

3.85

3.86

.471

Prepared

3.81

3.85

3.80

.388

Forecast Problems

3.80

3.94

3.73

.110

Looks for Participation from Customers

3.78

3.70

3.82

.228

Stays Informed of New Developments

3.77

4.03

3.96

.322

Enthusiastic

3.73

3.82

3.68

.190

Assertive

3.72

3.70

3.72

.426

Develops Supply Chain Relations

3.55

3.59

3.52

.357

Opens Discussions with Firm

3.53

3.79

3.42

.016*

Persistent

3.29

3.48

3.20

.068**

Risk Taker

3.16

3.36

3.05

.059**

Social Skills

3.11

3.13

3.09

.435

*Significant at the .05 level

**Significant at the .10 level
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TABLE 3
IMPORTANCE OF CHARACTERISTIC BASED UPON NUMBER OF CONTACTS
Characteristic

Overall Mean

Number of Contacts
0-20

21-50

51 +

Sig.

Groups

Dependability of Salesperson

4.62

4.73

4.42

4.70

.041

1-2

Ethical Conduct

4.54

4.59

4.26

4.73

.005

1-2, 2-3

Honest

4.53

4.51

4.48

4.63

.524

Provides Regular Service

4.44

4.65

4.26

4.30

.019

Develops Solutions to Problems

4.09

4.04

3.97

4.30

.188

Communication Skills

4.09

4.15

4.03

4.07

.808

Sells Solutions

4.08

4.12

3.87

4.23

.181

Listens to Customer Input

4.08

4.08

3.90

4.27

.162

Knowledgeable of Operations

4.06

4.08

4.00

4.03

.884

Sincere

4.06

4.16

3.77

4.20

.021

Expert on Product Offerings

4.05

4.18

3.84

4.03

.131

Tailored Presentation

4.05

4.63

3.43

3.73

.166

Flexibility in Customizing Services

4.04

4.16

3.77

4.10

.045

Resolves Concerns

3.98

4.04

3.87

4.00

.615

Maintains Contact with Customer

3.98

4.10

3.97

3.77

.192

Self-Confident

3.98

4.02

3.81

4.03

.355

Positive Outlook

3.88

4.10

3.61

3.72

.004

Motivation or Drive

3.87

3.96

3.61

3.93

.130

Identify Needs

3.86

4.00

3.65

3.83

.161

Prepared

3.81

3.98

3.48

3.87

.038

Forecast Problems

3.80

3.94

3.58

3.77

.148

Looks for Participation from Customers

3.78

3.90

3.74

3.63

.361

Stays Informed of New Developments

3.77

3.92

3.81

4.23

.048

Enthusiastic

3.73

3.90

3.65

3.50

.055

Assertive

3.72

3.69

3.52

3.97

.019

Develops Supply Chain Relations

3.55

3.56

3.45

3.60

.825

Opens Discussions with Firm

3.53

3.53

3.55

3.47

.923

Persistent

3.29

3.45

3.13

3.17

.231

Risk Taker

3.16

3.06

3.00

3.41

.193

Social Skills

3.11

3.06

3.19

3.03

.818

Group 1 = 0-20 contacts

22

Group 2 = 21-50 contacts
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1-2

1-2, 2-3

1-2

1-2

1-2

2-3

2-3

Group 3 = over 50 contacts

responding contact categories. However, after
the top four characteristics, numerous differ
ences in terms of the importance ratings were
found based upon the number of contacts
experienced. For example, several characteristic
ratings from those companies experiencing 51+
contacts were found. Specifically, the char
acteristics of Ethical Conduct, Honest, Develops
Solutions, Sells Solutions, Listens to Customers,
and Stays Informed of New Developments, were
rated higher than in the overall ratings. An
ANOVA technique was employed to examine
each characteristic and determine if significant
differences existed between contact groupings.
If significant differences were found, the
Bonferroni post hoc test was employed to
determine which groups were significantly
different. The results of this analysis are also
shown in Table 3. As can be seen from this
table, eight characteristics were found to differ
significantly between the contact categories, with
all differences being between either categories
one and two or categories two and three.
While no single variable had an overall reported
mean score of 5 (“must possess”), individual
respondents did report that they believed that
certain criteria fell into this area. Therefore, the
perceived importance of each characteristic was
examined based upon the specific type of
industry reporting with the results being shown
in Table 4.
The data reported in this table reveal that each
characteristic was reported as being a “must
possess” characteristic by several respondents.
These “must possess” scores ranged from a high
of 76 respondents or 66.7% for Dependability of
Salesperson to a low of 8 respondents or 7%
saying that a salesperson “must possess” the
characteristic of being a risk taker.
It is interesting to note that respondents from
each of the two types of shippers (non-manufac
turing and manufacturing) represented in this
study are very similar in their perception of most
of the characteristics, they do tend to differ on
several of the characteristics. For example,
while 43.8% of the non-manufacturing respon

dents reported that “Provides Regular Service”
was a must possess characteristic, 59.5% of the
manufacturing respondents reported it as being
a must have characteristic. Conversely, while
42.4% of non-manufacturing respondents
reported “Knowledge of Operations” to be a must
possess characteristic, only 20.5% of manu
facturing respondents found it to be a must have
characteristic. Again, it is clear that differences
between non-manufacturing firms and manufac
turing firms must be considered when designing
sales training programs.

CONCLUSIONS
Previous research which has examined the types
of characteristics or traits which salespeople
should possess has often been very general in
nature. The results of these studies have
revealed salesperson characteristics such as
possessing communication skills, product
knowledge, positive attitude, integrity, and sales
follow up as being desirable. The present study
broadens the body of knowledge in at least two
areas. First, salesperson characteristics were
evaluated in terms of their overall importance to
the transportation industry. This examination
revealed four characteristics which stand out as
being considered to be more important than all of
the other salesperson characteristics which were
examined. These characteristics were Depend
ability of Salesperson (4.62), Ethical Conduct
(4.54), Honest (4.53), and Provides Regular
Service (4.44). This information should lead
sales managers to evaluate their training
procedures to assure that the company’s sales
force truly understands the perceived impor
tance of each of these characteristics. While
being ethical and honest are harder
characteristics for a training program to address,
other characteristics such as the concept of
providing the customer regular service, along
with the other characteristics which also were
rated as being “important” would fit nicely into
most training programs. It is also important to
note that these levels of perceived importance
change slightly when the number of sales force
contacts are considered. Again, it would seem
that it is of importance to know and understand
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TABLE 4
REQUIRED SALESPERSON CHARACTERISTICS
Company Type
Characteristic

Must Have

Non-Mfg

Manufacturing

No.

%

No.

%

No.

%

Dependability of Salesperson

76

66.7

21

63.6

55

69.6

Ethical Conduct

68

59.6

19

57.6

47

59.5

Honest

63

55.3

18

54.5

44

55.7

Provides Regular Service

61

53.5

14

43.8

47

59.5

Communication Skills

39

34.2

11

33.3

28

35.9

Sells Solutions

36

31.6

12

36.4

24

30.4

Listens to Customer Input

34

29.8

12

36.4

22

27.8

Develops Solutions to Problems

33

28.9

8

24.2

25

32.1

Expert on Product Offerings

33

28.9

16

48.5

16

20.3

Maintains Contact with Customer

31

27.7

6

18.2

25

31.6

Knowledgeable of Operations

30

27.0

14

42.4

16

20.5

Sincere

29

25.4

11

33.3

18

22.8

Resolves Concerns

29

25.4

8

24.2

21

26.6

Customizes Services

26

22.8

10

30.3

16

20.3

Self-Confident

26

22.8

8

24.2

16

20.3

Informed of New Developments

25

21.9

7

21.2

18

22.8

Prepared

23

20.2

7

21.2

16

20.3

Forecast Problems

22

19.3

8

24.2

14

17.7

Motivation or Drive

21

18.4

8

24.2

13

16.5

Tailored Presentation

21

18.4

6

18.8

15

19.0

Identify Needs

20

17.5

6

18.2

14

17.7

Looks for Participation

20

17.5

5

15.2

15

19.0

Positive Outlook

18

15.8

7

21.2

11

14.1

Enthusiastic

13

11.4

6

18.2

7

8.9

Develops Supply Chain Relations from Customers

13

11.4

4

12.5

9

11.4

Opens Discussions with Firm

13

11.4

7

21.2

6

7.6

Social Skills

11

9.6

5

15.6

6

7.6

Assertive

10

8.8

3

9.1

7

8.9

Persistent

8

7.0

5

15.2

3

3.8

Risk Taker

8

7.0

4

12.1

3

3.8
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how many other contacts each firm might be
experiencing.
The second area of contribution is in the area of
providing information as to which characteristics
are thought to be “must possess” characteristics.
The perception of which characteristics a sales
person must possess is dependent upon the
particular type of company the salesperson has
targeted for his/her sales efforts. By under
standing which of these characteristics each
company type values, the sales manager is in a
better position to either attempt to identify
salespersons who possess these specific
characteristics or to attempt to fine tune the
sales force training programs to consider the
type of company the sales force will be

contacting. As a result of this tailored training,
the salesperson should be in a better position to
become more effective by tailoring his/her sales
presentation for the specific company type in
question.
Finally, future research should focus on at least
two specific areas. First, to address a limitation
of this research, future research should attempt
to survey a larger sample of shippers. While the
study consisted of a survey mailed out to over
500 shippers only 114 were returned and usable.
Second, future research should build upon the
attributes and characteristics identified in this
study and attempt to identify specific factors or
constructs that could be utilized in a theory of
buyer-friendly behavior.
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ABSTRACT
Managers/owners of short-line railroads were queried about three issues: (1) How would you
describe your company’s business relationship with the Class I railroad(s) with which you
interchange traffic; (2) Do you believe that mergers between Class I railroads have been good
or bad for short-line railroads; and (3) Besides merger activity, what do you believe will be the
most important trend for Class I railroads in the next 10 years?

INTRODUCTION
Short-line railroads (defined herein as railroads
with less than 250 miles of trackage) have been
part of the transportation industry for many
decades. Before 1970 their numbers had been in
a long term decline. For example, in 1916 there
were approximately 1,000 of these carriers, but
by 1970 the number had shrunk to about 240
companies (Levine et al., 1982). The federal
regulatory environment became more friendly

toward the formation of new short-line railroads
starting in the early 1970s. This was precipi
tated by the bankruptcy of the Milwaukee Road
and the Rock Island railroads. Because portions
of these railroads could be operated profitably,
the federal government enacted laws to facilitate
the operation of the viable segments of the failed
carriers. Specific legislation included: (a.) The 3R Act of 1973, (b.) The 4-R Act of 1976, and (c.)
The Local Rail Service Assistance Act of 1978
(Babcock et al., 1995).
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Further encouragement of the short-line rail
sector took place in 1980 by the enactment of the
Staggers Rail Act. This law facilitated the
formation of new short-lines by procedures that
liberalized the abandonment of light traffic
density trackage by the larger Class I railroads.
(Class I railroads are defined by the Surface
Transportation Board in terms of their annual
revenues, adjusted yearly for inflation.
Currently, Class I railroads have approximately
$260 million or more in revenues.) Much of the
abandoned trackage became the new short-line
railroads (Due 1984). Between 1980 and 1989,
approximately 230 new short-lines began
operation (Babcock et al., 1995).

Class I carriers will also continue to rationalize
their route system (Kruglinski 2001). Class I
railroads prefer to sell this trackage, because
short-lines generate additional business that
would have been lost if the trackage was
abandoned (Due 1984; Landry and Ozment
2001a). Finally, short-line railroads are also
involved in mergers. RailAmerica operates
approximately 40 short-lines in North American
and continues to add properties to its corporate
structure. In late 2001 it purchased StatesRail,
a privately owned company that operates eight
short-line railroads (Gallagher 2001a; Rock
2002).
Operating Characteristics

The purpose of this study is to learn more about
what managers of short-line railroads think
about Class I railroads. To accomplish this
objective, we surveyed about 450 owners/
managers of short-line railroads. Specifically,
this article will address the following topics: (a.)
A brief literature review, (b.) A description of the
research methodology utilized, (c.) An exami
nation of the respondents’ answers to this
question, “Overall, how would you describe your
company’s business relationship with the Class
I railroads with which you interchange traffic?”
(d.) A look at how the short-line owner/managers
answered this query, “Do you think the recent
history of mergers between Class I railroads has
been good or bad for short-line rail companies?”
and (e.) An analysis of how the respondents
replied to this question, “Besides merger activity,
what do you believe will be the most important
trend for Class I railroads in the next ten years?”

BRIEF LITERATURE REVIEW
Short-line railroads are typically established
when a Class I railroad spins-off their low traffic
density trackage. For example, when the
Burlington Northern and the Santa Fe railroads
merged in 1995, the combined carrier sold about
2,000 miles of trackage to short-line railroads
(Fairbank 1999). In 2000 the BNSF indicated
that additional lighter density trackage will be
spun-off to short-lines (Blanchard 2001c). Other
rail industry observers believe that additional
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There are approximately 450 short-line railroads
in the United States today (Pocket 2000). They
operate in an analogous manner to commuter
airlines that feed passengers between smaller
cities and major city airports. Short-line rail
roads collect freight from shippers on light
density trackage and transport it to the Class I
main-line intercity trackage for delivery to the
consignee, and vice versa. Rail industry
management consultant, Roy Blanchard, noted,
The short-line thus is the bridge between
the batch process of the Class I and the
custom-made process of the small
railroad (Blanchard 2001b).
Most, but not all (Turner 2001), short-line
employees are non-union. While this typically
results in lower wage rates, a more important
advantage to management is the less restrictive
work-rules compared to a unionized labor force.
Thus, the locomotive engineer may operate the
train in the morning, do track maintenance work
in the early afternoon, and make sales calls in
the late afternoon (Babcock 1995; Due 1984; Due
and Leever 1997; Probing 1995).
Problems
A recent survey of short-line railroad managers
by Professors Landry and Ozment found that the
most serious threat, as perceived by these

managers, involved their relationships with
Class I railroads (Landry and Ozment 2001b).
Here is a summary of the main problems
involving Class I railroads: (a.) Short-lines
receive an inadequate percentage of the total
revenues when interlining with Class I carriers
(Due and Leever 1997), (b.) After initially
purchasing the trackage from the selling Class I
carrier, it is so run-down from years of deferred
maintenance, that the short-line cannot afford to
bring it back to acceptable operating standards
(Carroll 2001), (c.) A “paper barrier” is often
imposed by the selling Class l carrier that
mandates that the short-line must interline
exclusively with them, even if other short-lines
or Class I’s have trackage that connects to the
short-line railroad (Wilner 2000c; Wilner 2001a;
Wilner 2000a), (d.) The Class I’s will not
adequately supply the short-line with rail cars
during times of seasonal shortages (Due and
Leever 1997; Gallagher 1999; Landry and
Ozment 2001b; Kaufman 2000a), (e.) Class I
railroads try to convince shippers to locate new
facilities directly on the Class Fs trackage, so the
Class I does not have to share the rail revenue
with the short-line (Burke 1997), (f.) Class I
carriers desire to exclusively transport rail cars
that accommodate 286,000 gross weight tons,
and many short-lines do not have trackage or
bridges that can safely handle this weight
(Burke 1997; Gallagher 2000; Saylor 1999;
Wilner 1999; Zarembski and Turner 2001), and
(g.) Class I service standards are often so bad
that shippers become frustrated and switch their
business to the trucking industry (Duff 2000a;
Gallagher 2000; Judge 2000; Kaufman 2000b;
Vantuono 2001a).
Three additional problems that do not involve
Class I railroads are: (a.) Short-lines are
devastated when floods or storms wash-out
bridges, tunnels and trackage, because they
typically do not have the ability to re-route their
trains around the problem (Due 1984), (b.)
There may not be enough business located on
their trackage to generate adequate revenues to
stay in business, especially if many of the
shippers are in the same business which then
experiences an economic downturn in their

industry (Due and Leever 1997; Glischinski
2000; Prater and Babcock 1998; Wilner 2001b),
and (c.) Federal Railroad Administration safety
regulations often place unreasonable burdens on
small railroads (Landry and Ozment 2001a;
Landry and Ozment 2001b).
Service Successes
The recent survey of short-line managers by
Professors Landry and Ozment also asked
respondents what was their greatest competitive
advantage over the Class I railroads. By far the
most common answer was their ability to provide
shippers with customized service (Landry and
Ozment 2001b). Service excellence increases
sales. Burlington Northern Santa Fe CEO Matt
Rose noted that in recent years, short-line
railroad revenues have been growing at an
annual rate of 7%, while Class Fs sales are
advancing only 2.5% annually (Blanchard 2001c;
Gallagher 2001c). BNSF Vice-President Peter
Rickershauser commented that,
Short-lines bring us business that we
couldn’t otherwise get, with a creativity
that, quite frankly, is hard to match
(Vantuono 2001a).
The BNSF obviously appreciates the service
excellence of short-lines. Dave Garin, a BNSF
manager, speaking at a rail industry conference
about short-line railroad strengths, observed,
“It’s all about service, service, service, and you
can do it best,” (Blanchard 2001a).
An example of this customer friendly service is
provided by the Indiana Rail Road. Its employees
stress improved service reliability. They daily
transport GE refrigerators with a dedicated 25
car train that runs from the GE factory at
Bloomington, Indiana, to CSXT, a Class I
railroad, at Indianapolis. Tom Hoback, CEO and
President of Indiana Rail Road, said
I’ve always believed that if you could run
a railroad like a business and not like a
railroad, you could do well. We took a
railroad that was going to be abandoned
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in the 1970s and increased traffic more
than five-fold (Blanchard 2001c).

Class I Mergers
The railroad industry’s “Golden Era” came to an
end in 1916. Prior to this, railroads had a near
monopoly on domestic intercity transportation.
The only serious competitor was barge trans
portation on a few waterways and coastal, or
intercoastal, shipping. Total railroad track
mileage in 1916 was 254,000 miles, and it
declined every year thereafter. The primary
reason was the growth of the trucking industry
(Stover 1961). Concomitant with the declining
trackage came a decrease in the number of
intercity railroads. In 1898 there were 836 Class
I railroads (Thirteenth 1900), and by 1936 this
number had decreased to 139 (Locklin 1938).
What follows are the number of Class I railroads
for selected years: 1970—71; 1980—42;
1990—16; 1994—13; and early 2002—7 (Annual;
Association 2002). Prior to the 1980s, many rail
mergers were “side-by-side,” meaning that the
two railroads in many cases served the same
geographic area. After the merger, the duplicate
trackage was often sold to short-line railroads.
More recently the predominant form of rail
merger has been the “end-to-end” type,
indicating that each railroad prior to the merger
served a different geographic area. These types
of mergers involved less reduction of trackage
(Burns 1998; Johnson and Whiteside 1975;
Saunders 2001; Wilner 1997).
With only four major rail systems in the
U.S.—Burlington Northern Santa Fe, CSX,
Norfolk Southern, and Union Pacific—some
shippers believe that rail management has
become arrogant. Edward M. Emmett, president
of the National Industrial Transportation
League, (a large shippers’ organization) noted,
Major rail customers continue to be
frustrated not only by inconsistent
service, but also. by a[n] “imperial”
attitude on the part of some railroads
(Gottlieb 2001).
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This situation, along with the service
breakdowns that have occurred with recent rail
mergers (some shippers refer to this as “track
trauma” (North 2000; O’Reilly 1998)), led the
Surface Transportation Board to declare a fifteen
month moratorium on all Class I rail mergers
that ended in June 2001. This action was taken
after the Burlington Northern Santa Fe and
Canadian National applied to the STB for
permission to merge. These carriers have since
withdrawn their merger application (Why 2000;
Shoot-out 2000; Wilner 2000b).
The newly revised STB rail merger guidelines
became effective in June 2001 (Rail 2001). They
were designed to not just preserve rail
competition, but to enhance it. Future rail
merger applications must contain a “Service
Assurance Plan,” which details exactly how and
why the combined carrier will be able to render
improved service to their shippers. In addition,
applications that contain “competitive enhance
ments” will be more favorably considered. These
include trackage rights, reciprocal switching
agreements, and improved efforts to work with
short-line railroads (New 2001).

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
To address the aforementioned objectives, a
survey of owners and managers of short-line rail
companies was designed. The mailing list was
compiled from Primedia Directories’ The Pocket
List of Railroad Officials. For purposes of this
study, a short-line railroad was operationally
defined as any railroad identified in the Pocket
List that operates a system that includes a
maximum of 250 miles of trackage. This
definition is consistent with but not identical to
the Surface Transportation Board (STB) “Class
III railroad” designation (any railroad with an
annual operating revenue of less than $20.5
million) and/or to the Association of American
Railroads (AAR) “local railroad” designation (any
railroad with an annual operating revenue below
$40 million and less than 350 miles of track
operated).

The actual mailing list was compiled as follows.
There are a total of 725 railroad companies
identified in the Pocket List. Of these, 125 were
deleted for one or another of the following
reasons:
• Company was identified as STB Class I or Class
II railroad
• Company was identified as an AAR regional as
opposed to local railroad
• Company was
United States

headquartered outside

the

• No mailing address was included with the
directory listing
Of the remaining 600 railroad companies, another
149 were deleted because of duplicated man
agement or cross-over ownership so that any
given individual would be asked to participate no
more than once. The final mailing list consisted of
451 unique owners/managers. Each of these per
sons was mailed a copy of the questionnaire
approximately one week following receipt of a
postcard announcing the survey and requesting
participation. In addition, each was sent a “thankyou” letter and follow-up copy of the question
naire approximately ten days later, for a total of
three separate mailed contacts. During this
period, nine questionnaires were returned for bad
addresses, reflecting a very high overall rate of
accuracy in the Pocket Directory.
Of the 442 delivered questionnaires, responses
were eventually received from a total of 114,
representing a response rate of 26%. This level of
participation is considered very adequate, espe
cially given the professional nature and harried
work lives of the sampled population of railroad
owners and managers. Of these 114 usable re
sponses, an additional seventeen were deleted
because they represented companies that
exceeded the 250 mile trackage limit set in the
operational definition of a short-line railroad
guiding this study. The remaining 97 companies
comprise the data base of short-line rail com
panies on which the results reported herein are
based.

PROFILE OF RESPONDENTS
AND RESPONDING COMPANIES
As measured by number of employees, the
responding companies were quite small. The
sample was divided almost evenly between
companies with fewer than ten employees
(49.5%) and those with ten or more employees
(50.5%). One-fourth of the responding companies
had fewer than five employees, and three-fourths
of them had fewer than twenty-five employees.
Company size was also measure by annual
revenue, but those results are not presented here
for two reasons. First, sixteen of the 97 qualified
respondents (16.5%) chose not to disclose their
annual revenue. Second, there is a significant
and fairly strong correlation (+.504, p < .001)
between revenue and number of employees.
A different dimension of a short-line railroad’s
size is captured by the total miles of trackage it
operates, that being an indication of the line’s
geographical coverage. About two-fifths (39.2%)
of the short-line companies in the study operate
with more than 50 miles of track (up to the
qualifying limit of 250 miles), and three-fifths
(60.8%) operate with fewer than 50 miles of
track. Again, forty percent of the companies have
fewer than 25 miles of track and fifteen percent
have fewer than ten miles of track.
Just over one-third (36.1%) of the companies
included in the study were formed before the
1980 Stagger’s Act that substantially
deregulated the U.S. rail industry. Another onefourth (26.8%) were formed during the industry’s
tumultuous decade of the 1980s, and the
remainder were started between 1990 and 2000.
Respondents were also queried about their own
age and education. They are very highly
educated. Nearly forty percent (39.2%) have
earned a 4-year degree, and another one-fourth
(24.7%) have received a graduate degree. Thus,
only about one-third of all respondents (36.0%)
do not have a college degree (but sixty percent of
that group have some college education). Finally,
almost six out of every ten (57.3%) are at least
Fifty years old.
Fall 2002

31

RELATIONSHIP WITH CLASS I
INTERCHANGE RAILROADS
It is absolutely essential to the financial health
of a short-line that it maintain a good working
relationship with the Class I railroads to whom
it bridges traffic. Without their Class I “part
ners,” short-lines would have no way of
connecting, literally or figuratively, with most of
the rest of the world. Correspondingly, short-line
owners and managers in the study were asked:
Overall, how would you describe your
company’s business relationship with the
Class I railroads with which you interchange
traffic?
____

Very Good

Good

employees were significantly more likely to say
they have a good or very good relationship with
their Class I interchange lines (73.5%) when
compared to those from companies with fewer
than ten employees (56.5%). Also, while not
statistically significant, there was also a
tendency for managers of older companies—
formed prior to 1980—to more often say they
have a good or very good relationship with their
interchange railroads (76.5%) and for managers
with a four year degree to say so (76.3%).
Collectively, these were the only three subgroups
in which more than seventy percent of managers
felt their relationship to the relevant Class I
roads was good or very good.
CLASS I RAILROAD MERGERS’
IMPACT ON SHORT-LINES

____ Neither Good nor Bad _____ Bad
____

Very Bad

Figure 1 contains the basic results pertaining to
this question. Only a very few respondents
characterized their relationship with Class I
railroads as being negative. Just three of the
ninety-seven participants said that the
relationship was bad, and no one said that it was
very bad. Conversely, half of the respondents
(50.0%) said that their relationship with
interchanging Class I rail lines was good, and
another fifteen percent (14.7%) said that it was
very good. In total, 64.7% of all respondents said
that they have a good or very good relationship
with their Class I “partners.” The remaining onethird of respondents (31.6%) characterized the
relationship as neither good nor bad.

Since passage of the Staggers Act in 1980, there
has been considerable merger activity involving
the nation’s Class I railroads. How has this
frenetic situation been received by the
owner/managers of short-line railroads? To
investigate this issue, each respondent was
asked:
Do you think the recent history of mergers
between Class 1 railroads has been good or
bad for short-line railcompanies?
____ Very Good

_____ Good

____ Neither Good nor Bad_____Bad
____ Very Bad

Please tell us why you responded as you did:
Figure 2 can be used to compare the percent of
respondents who said they have a good or very
good relationship with their Class I interchange
companies across various subgroups of the
sample based on characteristics of the res
pondent or his/her company.
The difference involving number of employees
was statistically significant at the ten percent
level (chi-square = 3.01; p < .10). Specifically,
managers of companies with ten or more
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Figure 3 presents the percentage responses to
this question. Clearly, more respondents think
the merger activity has been bad for short-lines
than think the reverse. In particular, 37.6% of
respondents think that the merger activity has
been bad for their sector, and another 18.3%

FIGURE 1
SHORT LINE’S BUSINESS RELATIONSHIP WITH CLASS I INTERCHANGE RAILROADS
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FIGURE 2
PERCENT INDICATING BUSINESS RELATIONS WITH CLASS I
INTERCHANGE RAILROADS IS GOOD/VERY GOOD BY CLASSIFICATION DATA
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FIGURE 3
CLASS I RAILROAD MERGERS’ IMPACT ON SHORT LINES

TABLE 1
CLASS I MERGERS: CROSS-TABULATION ANALYSIS

Class I
Railroad
Mergers’
Impact on
Short Lines:

Respondent Age

Year Company Formed

Respondent Education

Total
Trackage

Number of
Employees
Total

< 50
Years
<%)

50 +
Years
(%)

No
degree
(%)

4 Year
Degree
<%)

Grad.
Degree
<%)

Before
1980
<%)

1980
to
1989
<%>

1990
to
2000
(%)

< 50
miles
<%)

50 +
miles
<%)

< 10
(%)

10 +
(%)

Good/Very Good

20.5

20.8

28.1

26.3

4.3

27.3

19.2

17.6

17.9

27.0

17.8

25.0

21.5

Neither

20.5

24.5

21.9

23.7

21.7

21.2

19.2

26.5

28.6

13.5

22.2

22.9

22.6

Bad/Very Bad

59.0

54.7

50.0

50.0

73.9

51.5

61.5

55.9

53.6

59.5

60.0

52.1

55.9

Total

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.00

Base

(39)

(53)

(33)

(26)

(34)

(56)

(37)

(45)

(48)

(93)

(32)

(38)

(23)

think it has been very bad. Altogether, more
than half of the respondents (55.9%) think that
the Class I mergers have affected short-lines
negatively, as compared to just one in five
(21.5%) who think this activity has been good or
very good for short-lines. (Note: The remaining
22.6% of respondents said the mergers have been
neither good nor bad for their industry.) Overall,
the short-line railroad industry has not reacted
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well to the recent mergers involving their larger
cousins.
Table 1 presents a set of descriptive comparisons
of responses to this question across various
subgroups of the sample. Generally, the
contention that the recent merger history
involving Class I roads has been bad or very bad
for short line rail companies (representing 55.9%

of all respondents) was stronger than average
among respondents who:
• Possess a graduate degree (73.9%) and/or are
less than fifty years old (59.0%).
• Represent a company formed in the decade
following deregulation (61.5%).
• Work for a short-line with fewer than ten
employees (60.0%) or at least fifty miles of
track (59.5%).
Please keep in mind, however, that the overall
differences between subgroups in a given classifi
cation variable were modest; indeed, none was
statistically significant at the ten percent level or
less based on appropriate chi-square contingency
table tests.

IMPACT OF CLASS I MERGERS ON
SHORT-LINES: DETRIMENTAL
ASPECTS
Respondents were also asked to explain why
they felt as they did about the impact of Class I
mergers. Of the 54 owner/managers who thought
that Class I merger activity was either “bad” or
“very bad,” we were able to categorize their
responses into four general themes. Because
some respondents mentioned more than one
reason for their position, there were 84
rationales enumerated. Each of these general
themes will be examined in the descending order
of frequency that they were stated. In addition,
six reasons (7.1% of the total number of
explanations) were mentioned only once or twice,
and they are not included in the discussion.

competition often eliminated, there was no
longer any reason to be concerned about the
short-line’s business, because as a monopolist, it
was obtained by default. This explanation was
stated by 25 respondents, representing 29.8% of
the total number of reasons enumerated. Below
are five typical respondent comments. Each of
these statements is either a direct quotation or
an amalgamation of the comments of two or
more respondents.
• Without competition service gets worse, prices
rise, and nobody cares any more.
• Concentrated power produces less competition
from the connecting Class I railroads.
• Class I mergers have created giants that are
extremely difficult to communicate with
because of their arrogance. Actually you do not
work with them, they “dictate” rates, and are
generally unwilling to negotiate any aspect of
service that you would like to provide to your
customers.
• We used to have two Class I’s that, at least at
times, competed for our business. Now they
have merged and we have been forgotten about
in terms of meeting our needs, and those of our
customers. Class I monopoly power is harmful
to our long-term existence.
• When you have a monopoly, your attitude is
different than when you have competition. This
is exactly what is happening to Class I’s today.
They have a monopoly, and they know we
know it, and they let us know in no uncertain
terms that “it’s our way or else—literally take
it or leave it.”

Less Competition for Short-lines’ Business
The most common explanation why short-line
owner/managers believe Class I merger activity
has not been beneficial to them is that it has
decreased competition for their business.
Specifically, prior to the merger, the short-line
was served by two competing Class I railroads,
both of which desired to obtain more traffic from
the short-line railroad. After the merger, with

Class I Merger-Related Service
Breakdowns
Twenty-three respondents (representing 27.4%
of the total reasons) stated that as a result of
recent Class I unifications, and the resulting
service catastrophes, it has affected their
business in both the short and long-terms. Here
are four of their observations:
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• Recent mergers, and the service disruptions
that then took place, have focused rail
management on merger integration and cost
cutting, not on developing new business or
improving service. In any case, the result is
that frustrated shippers took their business to
the trucking industry, and some of this traffic
will never return to the rail system.
• First the Class 1’s merged. Then service levels
suffered. The result—we lost business
immediately and some of it has not come back
and I don’t think it will.
• As the Class 1’s try to digest their mega
mergers, service declines. This decline in
service particularly impacts short-lines,
because all we have to sell is service.
• Service has never been as bad as it is now and
nobody at the super-roads seems to pay more
than lip service to these problems. They just
don’t get it.

Class I’s Have Minimal Interest in Single
Car Shipments
Seventeen respondents (20.2% of the total
reasons) stated that mergers have hurt their
business because the newly enlarged Class I
railroads seem to have little interest in single, or
a few car, shipments. Below are three of their
observations.
• Today Class I’s do not want to focus on the
small moves—only on unit-trains, etc. These
small moves are the “lifeblood” of short-line
railroads. Their attitude is killing us and they
don’t seem to care.
• Class I’s apparently do not desire to pick-up a
small number of cars from short-lines. They
just want high volume shipments between
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major cities. Their marketing people do not
understand our shippers’ needs and
furthermore, they don’t want to.
• As the Class I’s become larger, the more their
personalized service to short-lines gets lost in
the shuffle. They do not realize, or if they do
they don’t care, that all we have to sell is
SERVICE!

Class I Bureaucracy Becomes Invidious
The final problem with Class I mergers, as noted
by 13 of our respondents (15.5% of the total
complaints), was that the resulting bureaucracy
of the enlarged railroad made it more difficult to
work with the Class I railroad. Below are three
of their statements:
• The merged railroad becomes even more
distant from us. We become more and more
isolated from them, and they have a harder
and harder time identifying with our situation.
Their bureaucracies are so mammoth that it
becomes very difficult for them to make
decisions in a timely manner. We can make
decisions almost immediately, but what good
does it do us, since we have to interline almost
all of our traffic with them.
• The larger the Class I’s become, the longer it
takes them to respond to our needs and
requests. Then when they finally do respond,
they are less sensitive to our customers needs,
both in terms of customized rates and services.
• Bigger is not better. It sure is slower when it
comes to making decisions!
Table 2 summarizes the reasons why respon
dents believed that Class I rail mergers are
detrimental to short-line railroads.

TABLE 2
DETRIMENTAL ASPECTS OF CLASS I
MERGERS ON SHORT-LINE RAILROADS
Reasons

Percentage

Less Competition for Short-Lines’
Business

29.8

Class I Merger-Related Service
Breakdowns

27.4

Class Is Have Minimal Interest in
Single Car Shipments

20.2

Class I Bureaucracy Becomes Invidious

15.5

Miscellaneous
Total

7.1
100.0

IMPACT OF CLASS I MERGERS ON
SHORT-LINES: POSITIVE BENEFITS
When respondents were asked their opinion
about the Class I merger movement, 21 short
line owner/managers thought it was either “very
good” or “good.” When queried about why they
took this position, we found that they
cumulatively noted 28 reasons. Three statements
were only mentioned once (10.7% of the total
number of explanations) and are not included in
the discussion below. Each of the two major
explanations will be examined below in the
descending order of frequency that they
appeared.

Class I’s Will Only Offer Main-Line Service
Nineteen respondents (representing 67.9% of the
total number of positive explanations) thought
Class I mergers were beneficial for their industry
because of the future direction of Class I
operations. These respondents thought Class I’s
will continue to heavily stress main-line intercity
transportation service. Therefore, in many
situations, the pick-up and delivery service will
have to be provided by the short-lines. The
result is the increasing importance of short-lines

to the rail industry. Below are Five of their
statements.
• Class I’s do not want to be involved directly
with customers. They desire to exclusively
dispatch high volume, high speed intercity
trains. We will become more and more
important as the customer contact personnel
with shippers/consignees. With our knowledge
of each customer’s transportation require
ments, we will provide the “real people”
customer service that all shippers/consignees
desire.
• Larger railroads do not want to be bothered by
a lot of switching at both ends of a shipment,
mainly because their labor costs are pro
hibitively expensive. Nor do they want to be
involved in shipments to smaller cities. Both of
these situations are our “bread and butter.”
This explains why we are in a growth industry.
• As each Class I gets bigger after a merger, they
become less customer acquainted. These mega
railroads do not care about the great majority
of medium and smaller shippers/ receivers.
This is great for us, because what they want
out of us is our strength and passion.
• Switching is the bane of large railroads. It is
our best service. Therefore, I love to see Class
I mergers!
• Before the latest wave of Class I mergers,
these large railroads were still trying to do
their own pick-up and delivery. Therefore, they
often did not want to try to work with me. Now
they approach me and ask me to partner with
them. It is an excellent division of labor. We
are each doing what we do best.

Accelerating Trend To Sell Branch-Line
Trackage
Six short-line owner/managers (representing
21.4% of the total number of reasons enumer
ated) stated that Class I mergers were beneficial
to their industry because it would accelerate
the sale of branch-line trackage to short
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line carriers.
observations.

Below

are

three

of

their

• Class I’s will continue to spin-off low density
trackage, which they are more and more
defining as any trackage that is not part of
their main-line system.
• Class I mergers are expensive. After the
merger, to generate additional dollars to pay of
debt, the combined carrier frequently sells off
low traffic trackage.
• Labor costs are killing Class I railroads. These
railroads can only operate efficiently and
profitably on high volume main-line trackage.
Especially after mergers, when top manage
ment must now “make their numbers” to show
the wisdom of the transaction, is when
additional spin-offs take place.
Table 3 summarizes the reasons why short-line
owner/managers believe Class mergers are
beneficial to their industry.

OTHER IMPORTANT CLASS I TRENDS
Each respondent was also asked,
Besides merger activity, what do you believe
will be the most important trend for Class I
railroads in the next ten years?
We were able to categorize the responses into six
general themes, each of which will be examined
below. When answering this query, the 97
respondents noted 117 reasons for their
responses. There were 16 answers (13.7% of the
total number of reasons enumerated) that were
only mentioned once or twice, and they are not
included in the discussion below. Each of the
explanations will be examined in the descending
order of frequency that they were mentioned.

Increased Utilization of Scheduled Trains
The most common response about future trends
for Class I railroads involved the increased
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TABLE 3
BENEFICIAL ASPECTS OF CLASS I
MERGERS ON SHORT-LINE RAILROADS
Reasons

Percentage

Class I Railroads Will Only Offer
Main-Line Service

67.9

Accelerating Trend to Sell BranchLine Trackage

21.4

Miscellaneous

10.7

Total

100.0

utilization of scheduled trains. This idea was
noted by 36 managers, representing 30.8% of the
total explanations given. This concept involves
trains departing classification yards on set
schedules, regardless of the number of cars that
have been accumulated when the train is
scheduled to leave (Vantuono 2001b; Ytuarte
2001). The effect of this type of train operation is
far more delivery schedule consistency. Below
are four respondent statements:
• Service, service, service—this is what will save
the rail industry. The key to this is scheduled
train operations, and the CN is showing the
world how it can be done.
• Our industry will become almost irrelevant if
service levels do not improve. If they don’t, we
will just get the bulk commodities that we get
by default, such as coal, grain, sand, fertilizers,
ores and bulk chemicals. The key to growth is
consistent and reliable delivery schedules, and
the key to this is scheduled train operations. It
is as simple as that.
• Class I’s must shift their orientation to being a
service oriented business, from one that is
operationally oriented. Scheduled train despat
ching is the obvious answer. At least I hope it
is the obvious answer, because if the Class I’s
don’t change, the industry will slowly die, and
it will take my company down with them.

• Re-engineering their operations to function
more like the trucking industry. That is, run
more trains on set schedules. Shippers will pay
for a reliable and consistent service.

Continued Class I Sale of Light Traffic
Density Trackage
Twenty-seven respondents (23.1% of all
explanations) stated that Class I railroads will
continue to sell their light traffic density
trackage to short-lines. The reason is that Class
I’s will operate with a new paradigm. It will
involve running trains primarily on their main
lines between major cities. Branch line trackage
will be sold to the short-lines, which will then
feed traffic to the Class Fs. In addition, Class Fs
will desire to de-emphasize customer contact
activities, such as pick-up and delivery services,
which will be operated more efficiently by the
short-lines. Here are three respondent obser
vations.
• The new Class I business model will involve
them operating
high speed, frequently
scheduled trains on their intercity main-lines.
Short-lines will become their partners to feed
traffic from shippers on lighter density
trackage.
• Class I carriers will be in the “wholesale”
transportation business. They will operate only
on main-line corridors between major cities.
The “retail” side of the rail business will be
conducted by short-lines. We will be the
customer contact people, who arrange pick-ups
and delivery, and customize service levels for
our shippers using the services of the Class I
railroads.
• Customer relations and marketing in general
is too labor intense for Class Fs. They just
desire to run their trains on the high traffic
density trackage. We will more and more
assume the marketing activities of the Class
Fs. Short-lines are starting to be appreciated
by the Class Fs for the essential services we
provide.

Rail Industry Renaissance
The 21st Century, according to 13 respondents
(11.1% of all reasons), will experience a rail
industry rebirth. The reason is that the highway
system cannot continue to expand to accom
modate additional traffic as the economy grows.
In addition, automobile passengers will continue
to press for governmental policies that shift
truck traffic from the highway system to the
underutilized rail industry. Here are three
comments.
• Rail/truck intermodal shipments will be the
norm for the 21st Century. It will happen
because we as a country cannot afford to even
maintain the existing highway system, let
alone build new highway lanes. As this takes
place, and it has to take place, we as short
lines will prosper along with the Class Fs.
• Traffic must come off of the highways! They
are too crowded now and the situation is
getting worse year by year. Either traffic will
go all rail, or it will be piggyback, but in any
case it will be transported between cities by
rail. This additional traffic will help the rail
industry, and since the Class Fs look to us to
be their marketing departments, our impor
tance can only grow.
• In my judgment, this question is a no-brainer.
The rail industry will become more important
by default. Traffic cannot stay on the
horrendously crowded highway system. The
only place it can go is to the rail system which
already has a substantial amount of
unusedcapacity. I just hope the Class Fs don’t
drop the ball on this issue.

Labor Cost Reduction
Ten short line-line owner/managers (8.5% of the
reasons noted) said the most important Class I
trend for the next decade is their reduction of
labor costs. Here are two of their statements.
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• The rail industry is plagued by high labor
costs. This is because the industry is highly
unionized. Many people do not realize that of
the three major modes of domestic
transportation, truck, rail, and air, the rail
industry has the highest average labor costs
(not counting management). The only way for
the rail industry to survive is to reduce labor
costs. They will do this by outsourcing as many
activities as possible. Short-lines will perform
the origination and delivery function, as well
as most customer service functions. The Class
I’s will exclusively provide just train service
between major cities, and all other activities
will be outsourced to short-lines.
• Class I unionized labor rates must come down.
Management will ask the craft and operating
rail unions to allow cross-functional workrules. Knowing rail unions, they will probably
not agree to this. If this happens, and I’m sure
it will, then Class I management will continue
to outsource all but their main-line operations.
This is why I believe the short-line rail
industry will become more important in the
future.

Governmental Funding of Rail
Infrastructure
Although traditionally the rail industry has
provided their own right-of-way with no
governmental funding, this may change. Some
Class I senior managers have said that this issue
is too important, and the capital requirements
are so great, that it needs to be studied with an
open mind (Gallagher 2001b). Eight respondents
(6.8% of the total reasons) said that in their
judgment governmental funding of the rail
infrastructure will become the norm. Here is one
comment.
• Class I railroads are not maintaining their
rights-of-way adequately. Just recently the
BNSF stated that they are cutting back on
their right-of-way maintenance, because the
railroad is not earning its cost of capital.
Therefore, if we as a country are going to shift
traffic from the highways to the rails, we must
40
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have a rail system that can accommodate this
additional traffic. That is why both the federal
and state governments are going to have to get
involved in funding the rail infrastructure. And
Class I management had better swallow their
pride and accept this financial help, just the
way the truckers and airlines have for decades.

Federal Rail Re-Regulation
Seven respondents (representing 6.0% of all
reasons) thought that the rail industry would be
re-regulated by the federal government because
of the monopoly situation existing for many
shippers today (Duff 2000b; Kertes 1998;
Kruglinski 2001). This situation exists because
there have been so many mergers that most
shippers today are served by only one Class I
carrier. Here is one observation.
• Class I's continue to alienate more shippers
and community elected officials. This arro
gance comes from being the “only game in
town.” It will lead to reinvigorated efforts to
re-regulate the railroads, because there is not
enough competition between railroads any
more. Any time an industry is federally
regulated, its vitality is diminished. Hence
short-lines will be hurt, because we are so
dependent on the Class I’s to provide the long
distance intercity movement.
Table 4 summarizes the Class I future trends as
predicted by the survey respondents.

SUMMARY
Short-line owner/managers were asked to
describe their business relationship with the
Class I railroads with which they interchange
traffic. The responses were positive; with almost
two-third's selecting the “good” or “very good”
choices. They were next queried regarding their
thoughts about how Class I railroad mergers
have affected their industry. Here the owner/
managers were less sanguine. More than half of
the respondents thought these mergers had a
detrimental impact on short-line railroads. When
asked why they took this position, the three most

TABLE 4

light traffic density trackage, and (3) A rail
industry renaissance.

MOST IMPORTANT CLASS I TRENDS
BESIDES MERGERS

CONCLUDING COMMENT

common rationales were: (1) Less competition for
short-line business, (2) Class I merger related
service breakdowns, and (3) Class I’s have
minimal interest in single car shipments.
However, about one-fifth of the respondents
thought that Class I mergers were beneficial to
them. The two reasons for this position were: (1)
Class I’s will offer only main-line service, and (2)
The accelerating trend to sell branch-line
trackage. The final question involved short-line
owner/managers perceptions of the most
important trends among Class I railroads, not
counting mergers. The three most common
responses were: (1) Increased utilization of
scheduled trains, (2) Continued Class I sale of

The railroad industry is composed of two
components—the short-lines and the Class I’s.
This survey, in our judgment, conclusively
illustrates the symbiotic relationship that exists
between the two parts. They need each other.
However, as this survey strongly indicates, only
one of the two parties clearly understands this.
Short-line owner/managers know that their
destiny is tied to the Class I’s. Unfortunately, it
appears that from the viewpoint of short-line
owner/managers, their importance to the Class
I’s is often not appreciated or even compre
hended. As we gaze into our “crystal ball,” here
is how we see the future. We believe Class I
carriers will continue to spin-off low traffic
density trackage to short-line railroads. The
Class I’s will also outsource more activities that
others can do more efficiently than they can.
This will be especially prevalent with labor
intensive functions, such as customer service
activities and the pick-up and delivery of rail
cars. The Class I’s will specialize in what they
do best—running scheduled trains on main-line
trackage between major cities. The short-lines
will feed cars between the shippers/consignees
and the Class I’s which provide the intercity
transportation. As this relationship matures,
both parties will desire to work together more
closely for their own mutual benefit. The result
will be a true “win-win-win” situation. Shippers/
consignees will receive better service at less cost,
while each of the rail partners becomes more
efficient and profitable. We believe the 21st
Century will experience a rail renaissance.
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LIBERALIZATION OF INTERNATIONAL
AIR TRANSPORTATION MARKETS:
THE EFFECT OF TERRORISM ON
MARKET TRENDS
Dawna L. Rhoades
Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University

ABSTRACT
Since the United States deregulated its airline industry with the Airline Deregulation Act of
1978, the international air transport industry has been on a path toward market
liberalization. Market changes have included entry, capacity, and pricing freedom as well as
increased levels of foreign ownership. The recent terrorist acts of September 11, 2001 have
the potential to alter, if not reverse this course. This paper examines the forces fueling the
trend toward liberalization and analyzes the impact of recent events on the future prospects
of open aviation markets.

INTRODUCTION
According to the World Investment Report 2001
published by the United Nations Conference on
Trade and Development, global foreign direct
investment rose to a record US$1.3 trillion
dollars in 2000. Contributing to this increase
was the number of cross border mergers and
acquisitions, which were up nearly 50 percent to
US$1.1 trillion (UNCTAD, 2001). In addition to
the growth in FDI, world merchandise and
service exports have continued to post significant
gains.
World Trade Organization figures
indicate that merchandise exports rose to
US$5.47 trillion dollars in 1999 while service
exports rose to US$1.35 trillion for the same
period. Travel services accounted for $440

billion of these dollars (World Trade Organiza
tion, 2001). The latest estimates from the
International Air Transport Association are that
the total economic output of the air transport
industry is over US$1.3 trillion. In the United
States alone, the airline industry contributed
nearly $273 billion dollars to the total economy,
including $109.1 billion in direct expenditures
(salaries, purchase of equipment, etc), $109.1
billion in indirect benefits (airports revenue,
travel agency), and $54.6 billion in visitor
spending and conference revenues (Air Transport
Association, 2000).
While the international air transport industry
has played a significant role in globalization of
economic activity, the industry itself has
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remained firmly rooted in the domestic market.
Governments around the world have treated
airlines like a public utility whose service is said
to be in the public interest. The public interest
argument is based on three areas: national
security and use in national defense under
programs like the U.S. Civil Reserve Air Fleet
program, postal air delivery, and contribution to
commercial activity (Kane, 1999). International
airlines also “carry the flag” and represent the
national achievement and pride of their home
country. This latter role is not to be underesti
mated. When the bankruptcy and subsequent
grounding of the Swissair fleet forced the Swiss
football team to fly Aeroflot to a qualifying match
in Moscow, one article reported this as a “further
humiliation for the Swiss flag carrier” (Hall,
Grant, Done, Cameron, and Dombey, 2001).
Because of the special status accorded to air
transport, governments have always taken an
interest in promoting and protecting their
national carriers. Directly or indirectly govern
ments played an important role in shaping their
national aviation systems. A tightly regulated
international aviation market whose basic
precepts were laid out even before the end of
World War II insured protecting the national
industry and its carrier(s). In recent years that
regulatory regime has come under increasing
pressure to liberalize. The terrorist attacks of
September 11, 2001 have called this trend into
question as governments worldwide now struggle
with issues of security.
Many of these
governments are also faced with an aviation
system on the verge of collapse.
The purpose of this paper is fourfold. First, the
regulatory development of the air transportation
system will be reviewed, including the rationales
for treating air transport as a special case in
international business.
Second, the forces
leading to liberalization of this market will be
examined. Third, the progress in air liberali
zation will be discussed prior to the recent
terrorist attacks. Finally, the impact of these
attacks on the transportation industry and
liberalization will be assessed.
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REGULATORY DEVELOPMENT
The development of a regulatory regime for the
international air transport industry can be
divided into four phases. Phase I witnessed the
birth of the industry and a philosophical struggle
between freedom and tight regulation. Phase II
began with the reluctant acceptance of a system
of relatively tight regulation. Phase III saw
deregulation of the U.S. air transport industry
and renewed efforts for a more liberal inter
national air transport regime. Phase IV may
mark its beginning on September 11, 2001 with
the attacks on the World Trade Center and
Pentagon.
Phase I, 1910-1943
Seven years after the first heavier-than-air,
manned flight of the Wright Brothers at Kitty
Hawk, the first international conference on air
navigation was convened in Paris in 1910. The
key debate was over the rights and privileges of
flying. One view sought to apply the “Freedom of
the Seas” model to the entire airspace and was
championed by the French and German
delegations. The other view argued for the
sovereignty of nations over the airspace above
their terrestrial borders with rights to control
entry and in airspace activities. The British
were the key proponents of the national
sovereignty faction. While the Paris Conference
did succeed in identifying the key concepts,
terms, and technical provisions of international
aviation, it failed to resolve the freedom/
sovereignty debate. In the absence of interna
tional agreement, the British moved to pass the
British Aerial Navigation Act in 1911 (amended
in 1913). This act declared British rights to its
sovereign airspace and gave the Home Secretary
full power to regulate the entry of foreign
aircraft.
The other European governments
followed the British example prior to the
beginning of World War I.
World War I clearly demonstrated the potential
of aviation in the military arena as an offensive
and defensive weapon. The ability of aircraft to

support the transportation of troops and
equipment would not be fully realized until
World War II, but the supporting role of aviation
was not ignored following World War I. An
aeronautical commission formed as part of the
Peace Conference ending World War I decided to
prohibit the development of military aviation in
Germany but to allow civil aviation to continue.
The Commission also drafted the Paris
Convention of 1919 whose first article
proclaimed the right of each state to “complete
and exclusive sovereignty over the airspace
above its territory.” The Paris Convention would
remain in effect until superceded by the Chicago
Convention (Sochor, 1991).
The period between the two world wars saw two
different models of government intervention in
the development of the domestic air trans
portation system. Direct intervention became
the most frequent method of promoting domestic
aviation. Governments either provided direct
subsidies and/or assumed full or partial
ownership of air transport companies. British
Airways and Air France are two classic examples
of this strategy. The British Overseas Airways
Corporation (BOAC) was created in 1939 when
two smaller British carriers were merged and
nationalized. Air France emerged in 1933 from
the merger and nationalization of Air Orient, Air
Union, CIDNA and SGTA (Hengi, 2000). This
direct intervention did not suit the philosophical
and political tastes of U.S. lawmakers and
officials.
Indirectly, the U.S. government
strongly influenced domestic air transportation
through the U.S. Post Office Department that
was authorized by the Air Mail Act of 1925, also
called the Kelly Act, to enter into contracts with
private persons or companies to transport mail
by air. The Air Mail Act was amended in 1930 to
give the postmaster the authority to consolidate
routes in the public interest. Postmaster Walter
F. Brown used his authority to redraw the air
map of the U.S. and award air mail contracts to
a small group of airlines that he considered well
run and financially stable. In fact, Brown had
told the carriers that the air mail routes would
be consolidated and awards granted only to
carriers with sufficient size to serve the route.

This “forced” major consolidation in the industry
in an effort to obtain these very lucrative
contracts, which could provide the stable income
that passenger service did not offer.
Many routes started offering passenger service
to provide “additional income” to their air mail
business (Davies, 1984). A scandal fueled by
smaller carriers who were excluded from these
contracts temporarily halted all airmail awards.
The Air Mail Act of 1934 changed the system of
awarding contract and barred all prior contract
holders from bidding on new awards. However,
the new post-master general, Farley, privately
advised these airlines to reorganize and reapply.
Thus, the airlines known as American Airlines,
Eastern Airlines, and United Airlines were
formed. In fact, almost all of the major U.S.
carriers except Southwest, America West, and
Alaska Airlines can trace their origin to early air
mail carriers. The increasing importance of air
mail added a further argument to the “public
interest” status of air transportation (Wells,
1994). By 1998, the ten major U.S. airlines were
responsible for carrying over 251,279 tons of mail
(Aviation Week, 2000).
Phase II, 1944-1978
While World War I hinted at the importance of
air transportation to the security of nations,
World War II with the Battle of Britain and mas
sive bombing campaigns clearly demonstrated
it’s potential. The technological advances made
during and just prior to the war also showed that
the industry could contribute economically as an
engine for innovation. Even as U.S. President
Franklin D. Roosevelt and British Prime
Minister Winston Churchill were meeting in
Quebec to plan the cross-channel invasion, the
topic of a general meeting to discuss the future of
air transportation came up as an issue. The
conference was convened in Chicago on
November 1, 1944. Representatives of all but
one of the allied World War II nations attended
it. The delegates were presented with four
proposals for an international aviation system.
The joint proposal of Australia and New Zealand
called for international ownership and manage
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ment of all international air service. The United
States proposal sought a system with
unrestricted air service rights and market-based
control of frequency and fare issues. The British
wanted an international regulatory body to
distribute air routes and determine frequency
and fares. The Canadians offered a compromise
proposal that would have allowed limited
competition in a system controlled by a
multilateral oversight body. No agreement could
be reached on the main issues. Neither the U.S.
nor Great Britain was willing to compromise
their positions or jeopardize efforts to conclude
the war. Great Britain also had one final card to
play—landing rights.
They suggested the
possibility of developing an all-Commonwealth
airline with exclusive landing rights in
Commonwealth and British territories. Since
the parties had no reason to assume that the
British Empire would change following the war,
this appeared to be a credible threat (Sochor,
1991).

Without agreement on anything but the basic
freedoms at the conclusion of the Chicago
Convention, national governments were forced to
fall back on the traditional means of resolving
territorial disputes—treaty. In 1946, two key
wartime allies and aviation leaders, the United
States and the United Kingdom, met to negotiate
and sign the first bilateral air service agreement.
The Bermuda Agreement as it is now known
became the model for all future bilateral air
service agreements. The Agreement granted
each party the five freedoms of the air (Table 1
lists these five and the four additional freedoms
added later.) on named routes for multiple
carriers without specifying capacity or frequency
limitations. The U.S. also agreed in principle to
the establishment of an international body, the
International Air Transport Association (IATA),
to set fares. Subsequent bilaterals not including
the U.S. also included frequency and capacity
limitations that attempted to split air traffic
between designated carriers of the two countries

TABLE 1
THE FREEDOMS OF THE AIR
Freedom

Description

First

The right to fly over the territory of a contracting state without landing

Second

The right to land on the territory of the contracting state for non-commercial purposes

Third

The right to transport passengers, cargo, and mail for the state of registration to the aircraft to another state
and set them down there

Fourth

The right to take on board passengers, cargo, and mail between two other states in another contracting state
and to transport them to the state of registration of the aircraft

Fifth

The right to transport passengers, cargo, and mail between two other states as a continuation of, or as a
preliminary to, the operation of the third or fourth freedoms

Sixth

The right to take on board passengers, cargo, and mail in one state and to transport them to a third state
after a stopover in the aircraft’s state of registration and vice versa

Seventh

The right to transport passengers, cargo, and mail between two other states on a service that does not touch
the aircraft’s country of registration

Eighth

The right to transport passengers, cargo, and mail within the territory of a state that is not the aircraft’s
country of registration (full cabotage)

Ninth

The right to interrupt a service
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involved. A pooling agreement was often
included to insure that revenue was evenly
divided between country carriers (Toh, 1998).
Bermuda I was a compromise that clearly
favored the U.S., as did most of the other
agreements signed shortly after the war. Unlike
the nations of Europe, the U.S. had both a
number of air carriers and an intact aviation
system. It also had money that many countries
sought to help them rebuild following the war.
As a result, the U.S. carriers were granted
greater capacity and frequency freedom as well
as more extensive beyond or fifth freedom rights.
By 1976, the British felt confident enough to give
notice of their decision to terminate Bermuda I.
The Bermuda II agreement, signed in 1977
eliminated multiple carrier designations, limited
capacity, and restricted American fifth freedom
rights. The U.S. viewed this as a major setback
in the liberalization of international air
transport (Toh, 1998).

Phase III, 1979-2000
To demonstrate it’s commitment to air transport
liberalization, the United States initiated three
actions in 1978. In early 1978, the U.S. issued a
statement entitled “Policy for the Conduct of
International Air Transportation.” This state
ment reaffirmed the U.S. commitment to
liberalization. Shortly afterwards, the Civil
Aeronautics Board (CAB) issued an order to
IATA to “show cause” why they should not be
considered an illegal cartel as prohibited by U.S.
anti-trust law. Since LATA membership was
restricted to international airlines whose major
tasks included setting fares and capacity, there
was little argument of violation. Finally, in late
1978, the United States became the first
government in the world to deregulate its air
transport industry with the passage of the
Airline Deregulation Act. This Act would phase
out the CAB with it’s market control over
entry/exit, pricing, and service levels and house
the remaining safety functions of the federal
government with the Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA).

The International Air Transportation Competi
tion Act (IATCA) of 1979 laid out the competitive
goals of future U.S. policy as encouraging 1)
multiple carrier designation without operational
restrictions, 2) market-based determination of
air fares, and 3) elimination of unfair and
discriminatory competitive practices such as
excessive user fees, exclusive airport services,
and limited access to facilities. These features
are incorporated in the U.S. policy of open skies
(see Toh, 1998 for further discussion). The U.S.
pursued two paths toward fostering open skies.
The Director of the Bureau of Pricing and
Domestic Aviation at the CAB laid out the first
path. The so-called Encirclement Strategy called
for the U.S. to bring pressure on smaller market
countries to sign open skies agreement as a
means of diverting traffic from larger aviation
markets.
This strategy was based on the
assumption that open skies would lower fares
between those countries involved and cause
passengers to change their traveling patterns in
pursuit of lower fares. The pressure of falling
traffic would then encourage larger market
countries such as the United Kingdom and
Japan to accept the more liberalized open skies
agreement (Levine, 1979). The U.S. first sought
open skies with smaller market countries. These
countries generated very little third and fourth
freedom traffic (to and from the U.S.), but stood
to gain by getting greater access to U.S.
destinations. There could also be no question of
exchanging domestic opportunities since these
small nations had little domestic traffic to
exchange (Antoniou, 2001). There is evidence to
support the economic benefits of open skies. In
the case of the U.S.-Canadian agreement, results
in the year immediately following the
implementation of the agreement saw an
increase in traffic of over one million passengers
as well as growth in the number of cities served
(Office of International Aviation, 1996; Pustay,
1997).
The second path to open skies came through the
application of the U.S. Department of
Transportation’s (DOT) policy on approving
airlines alliances. This policy based approval on
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either the coverage of the rights under existing
bilateral or proven benefits to the U.S. (Gellman
Research Associates, 1994). In addition, the U.S.
DOT has granted immunity from antitrust to
alliances between carriers from open skies
countries. Antitrust immunity allows competi
tors to coordinate on issues of pricing, capacity,
and scheduling. This has allowed those alliances
with immunity to achieve greater levels of
operational integration, thus cutting costs and
improving quality through coordination (Oum
and Park, 1997).
The “carrot and stick”
approach toward achieving open skies has
results in some 50 open skies agreements (Table
2).
Other countries were also pursuing a more
liberal approach to aviation. Unlike the U.S.
domestic deregulation, the Europeans opted for
a more gradual approach to aviation
deregulation. The first and second packages
(1987 and 1990 respectively) liberalized air
transport among members of the European
Community by creating additional route and
carriers designation as well as lifting capacity
limitations. The third package, which became
effective in 1993, phased in further liberalization
ending in April 1997 with the creation of a single
aviation market in the European Union (Morrell,
1998).
Under this single market, carriers
established in any of the EU countries are
granted all of the so-called freedoms of the air.
With this step, the Europeans have taken the
lead in air transport liberalization. In fact, the
position of the European Commission,
Directorate General for Transport on open skies
is that “[o]pen skies is an American term which,
as we see it, is synonymous with a free for all
system depending on the good behavior of air
carriers and only a partial opening of the
market” (Sorenson, 1998, p. 125). The current
European view is that ownership and domestic
markets should be opened. These concepts are
embodied in a proposal put forth by the
Association of European Airlines (AEA) called
the Transatlantic Common Aviation Area
(TCAA). While the AEA suggests that TCAA
should include liberalization of airline ownership
and right of establishment as well as harmoni
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zation of competition and leasing policies, the
basic objective “must be to ensure that all
airlines of the parties to the TCAA will have
unrestricted commercial opportunities to conduct
the business of air transport anywhere within
the TCAA.” (Association of European Airlines,
2001). Acceptance of this agreement would
essentially create a single aviation market across
the North Atlantic.
Other areas associated with air transport have
also been undergoing liberalization including the
privatization of airports, air traffic control
systems, and airport related services such as
security and the removal of restrictive policies
that favored domestic over foreign carriers. The
privatization of airports began in 1987 when
Great Britain sold seven of its airports to the
British Airport Authority (BAA). Since this
time, airports in Australia, Germany, Italy,
Argentina and a dozen other countries have
shifted from public to private hands (Pope, 1996;
Utt, 1999). Air traffic control systems have been
or are being privatized in such countries as
Canada, Switzerland, South Africa, and
Germany in the belief that private firms would
not only be able to raise capital more quickly but
would have a greater incentive to modernize
ATC systems, decreasing delays and improving
safety (McCartney, 2001).
In short, the aviation industry in general
underwent a major reorientation during the
third phase of its existence. Liberalization
increasingly won out over efforts to maintain the
tightly restricted markets of the past. These
efforts have made air travel more affordable for
passengers and airfreight more viable for
international shippers. Liberalization has placed
a burden on those few remaining governmentowned and run international airlines. It has also
threatened the small, nation market airlines
such as the Belgian airline Sabena. In fact,
liberalization has been a particular burden on
small, developing nations that have neither the
resources to compete effectively with the larger
international carriers nor the markets to attract
foreign interest and investment (Abeyratne,
1998). Nevertheless, as economies grew the level

TABLE 2
OPEN SKIES AGREEMENTS
Year

Date

Country

Year

Date

Country

2000

11/28
7/27
5/2
3/16
10/12
10/11
3/16
8/26
6/30
10/11
12/15
1/8
8/28
5/2

Benin
Burkino Faso
Gambia
Ghana
Malta
Morocco
Namibia
Nigeria
Portugal
Rwanda
Senegal
Slovak Rep.
Tanzania
Turkey

1995

6/14
9/5
6/16
6/9
6/14
6/6
6/16
6/16
6/15

Austria
Belgium
Denmark
Finland
Iceland
Luxembourg
Norway
Sweden
Switzerland

1999

12/6
5/24
10/21
12/16
12/6
11/10
4/12-29
10/21
4/13

Argentina
Bahrain
Chile
Dominican Republic
Italy
Jordan
Pakistan
Qatar
Umted Arab Emirates

1992

10/14

The Netherlands

1998

6/9
7/14
6/10
7/15
6/9
3/18
2/27

Korea
Antilles (Netherlands)
Peru
Romania
South Korea
Taiwan
Uzbekistan

1997

9/18
6/20
5/8
5/8
5/8
5/8
6/21
6/18
5/8
5/8
4/8

Aruba
Brunei
Costa Rica
El Salvador
Guatemala
Honduras
Malaysia
New Zealand
Nicaragua
Panama
Singapore

1996

9/10
5/42

Czech Republic
Germany

Fall 2002

51

of air travel increased. Faster growing regions
such as Asia saw double-digit growth rates
during the 1980s and early 1990s.
Phase IV: 2001 and Beyond
Even before September 11th, the U.S. airline
industry was on a path to lose US $2 billion
(Arndt, Byrnes, and Woellert, 2001). Part of the
blame can be attributed to the same two
historical forces that have plagued the industry
for decades, a softening economy and over
capacity. As one famous disgruntled investor,
Warren Buffet, has noted,
The airline business, from the time of
Wilber and Orville Wright through 1991,
made zero money net (Miller and
Barnhart, 2001).
In fact, the industry suffered its worst previous
loss between 1990-1993 when it posted losses in
excess of US$10 billion (Rosen, 1995). The
airline industry is an old-line, cyclical industry
with high fixed costs and a very unionized,
powerful labor force. The industry that
witnessed significant consolidation following de
regulation has become increasingly concentrated
with the top ten major carriers responsible for
the carriage of the bulk of U.S. scheduled traffic.
While the remainder of the 1990s saw improved
profitability, there were a number of troubling
trends including sharp declines in overall service
quality (rising customer complaints, delays),
disgruntled high yield business passengers, and
labor unrest at such airlines as United,
American, and Comair (Rhoades and
Waguespack, 2001). Even the US$15 billion
bailout of the Air Transportation Stabilization
Act is not likely to prevent a number of U.S.
carriers from filing for bankruptcy (Arndt et al,
2001). Meanwhile European carriers are already
protesting this government aid and requesting
assistance from their own governments (Flottau,
2001). Some of the hardest hit EU airlines are
already requesting assistance (Sparaco and Wall,
2001).

52

Journal of Transportation Management

If there were ever any questions of the economic
importance of the air transport industry before,
there are few who doubt it now. U.S. airlines
have already announced layoffs of approximately
100,000 employees and some estimates claim
that there will be an additional six jobs lost in
the U.S. economy for each airline loss. The
airline industry appears unlikely to turn a profit
until at least 2003. Initially, the hardest hit
area will be the travel and tourism industry,
which generates over US$578.8 billion a year
and supports one out of every 17 jobs. Aircraft
manufacturers such as Boeing will also be hard
hit and are preparing for layoffs. Other aviation
system manufacturers such as Rockwell Collins,
Textron, Honeywell, and Goodrich are likely to
follow suit raising manufacturing layoffs up to
100,000 (Arndt and Woellert, 2001; Isidore, 2001;
Mecham, 2001).
FUTURE DIRECTIONS
Given the impact of recent events, the trend
toward further liberalization in international
transport is likely to stall and may well reverse
itself as nations struggle to stabilize their
aviation industries. The U.S. bailout smacks of
the kind of government subsidy that the U.S. has
historically derided other governments for
providing and includes provisions that would see
the U.S. government taking a non-voting stake
in airline ownership through either stock
options, warrants or other equity devices (Bond,
2001; Toh, 1998).
Government authorities,
particularly in the U.S., may well rethink their
position on industry consolidation in the face of
widespread industry bankruptcy.
If the
bankrupt carriers are allowed to continue
operation as Continental and America West did
during previous bankruptcies, the industry
would likely face the same devastating price
wars that have plagued it in the past as cashstrapped carriers drive prices down and keep
capacity up (Wolf, 1995). The inability of air
transportation to generate long-term profitability
has driven stock prices down over 41 percent and
downgraded some carrier’s credit rating to junk
bond status (Isidore, 2001). Insurance premiums

have risen by a factor of 15 for war risk and
eight-fold for passenger liability (Sparaco, 2001).
Increased security costs will either be passed
onto consumers or borne by the U.S. government
if security is federalized (Arndt and Woellert,
2001; Ott, 2001).
It is clear that liberalization will be at least
temporarily stalled as governments struggle
with the immediate security and economic issues
raised by the terrorist attacks. The length of
the stall is partly contingent on the global efforts
to “root out terrorism.” The long-term fate of
international aviation is a matter of conjecture,
but the following three scenarios seem most
likely.
Scenario One
The trend toward liberalization reverses itself as
nations revert to a very protectionist approach to
aviation. The longer the war on terror, the more
likely international aviation is to slip back into
the old protectionist pattern. If the events of
September 11th threaten to devastate national
airlines and economies, governments are even
more likely to take actions to protect jobs and
markets. Even before 9/11, there were forces at
work that sought to pull back from liberalization.
Examples of this trend include the European
debate over the fate of Sabena and Swissair.
The Belgian and Swiss governments are intent
on “saving” their national airlines for reasons
that opponents believe violate the concepts of
free, open markets. The Canadian decision to
allow Air Canada to merge with Canadian
Airlines was also seen as a resurgence of
aviation nationalism. Most recently, Europeans
have complained that the U.S. package of loan
guarantees to post-9/11 carriers exceeded the
level warranted by shutdown losses and should
constitute illegal subsidies.
Scenario Two
Consolidation accelerates to the point that
national governments feel forced to consider
allowing at least limited foreign involvement in
domestic markets as a means of generating

competition.
This has already occurred in
Canada where government officials have not only
indicated that they might consider allowing
foreign carriers into the domestic market but
have floated a proposal for a North American
single aviation area. Under this scenario, a
TCAA might also come about for several reasons.
First, the security levels of most EU carriers are
at least equal if not higher than current U.S.
levels. Secondly, allowing EU allies in the war
on terror into the U.S. market would be more
palatable than throwing the market open to all
foreign nationals. Finally, it might be seen as a
reasonable concession to allies who have pushed
for such an opening. In an effort to aid their
airlines, the EU members might push even
harder. They could be aided in their efforts by a
decision due out in early 2002 from the European
Court of Justice on whether the EC has the right
to negotiate aviation agreements with countries
outside the EU. If the EC were to declare the
EU a single aviation unit, then the extensive
“beyond rights” of US carriers would be
considered cabotage and voided (Bond, 2001).
A number of issues would have to be resolved
before this scenario could come about including
changes in ownership rules, right of establish
ment, and harmonization of a number of the
laws and policies affecting aviation including
anti-trust policies, operation of aircraft, leasing,
etc (European Cockpit Association, 2000). There
could be a disconnect between the domestic and
international markets. In an effort to reduce
costs, many major carriers have announced plans
to withdraw from less profitable domestic routes,
many of whom will see regional carrier entry
(Ott, 2001). In addition, the growth of general
and business aviation could continue as aviation
fears, disgruntled business passengers, and
flexjet leasing programs make it an attractive
option to commercial travel. Major carriers
would then focus more on international aviation.
In effect, there would be a system of smaller,
regional carriers linking to major, international
hubs. With a further relaxation of ownership
rules, it is possible that the Australian/New
Zealand proposal at the Chicago Convention for
internationally owned and managed carriers
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would finally become a reality. The current
mega-alliance (Star, Oneworld, SkyTeam)
structure might form the nucleus of such
carriers.
Scenario Three
In a further twist, it is possible that the industry
would decouple even further into distinct
businesses such as fleet management,
transportation, and marketing (Sparaco, 2001).
This decoupling might allow the industry to get
around some of the ownership restrictions that
currently prevent international consolidation.
Arguments for this type of decoupling draw their
rationale from two distinct but related fields of
strategic thinking. The first area is concerned
with defining a firm’s core or distinctive
competency. This resource-based view of the
firm suggests that firms are collections of
tangible and intangible assets that when
combined develop competency in certain areas.
This competency is defined as a skill, knowledge
or ability that a firm possesses that allows it to
achieve a competitive advantage over its rivals
(Barney, 1991; Peteraf, 1993; Wernerfelt, 1984).
Under this theory, airlines would determine
what activity they could perform better than
rivals, then focus on this activity and outsource
other activities to firms that have an advantage
in that area.
The second, related area concerns the value
chain. In essence, a firm is a collection of linked
activities that may produce value for customers
(Porter, 1985). In a decoupled system, higher
profits would accrue to firms performing higher
value-added activities. Industries can be said to
have value chains, sequences of activities that
lead to a final product or service.
In
manufacturing settings such as automobiles,
aircraft, etc., it appears that the integrator (firm
responsible for some parts manufacturing,
supply network management, and final product
assembly) earns the superior industry returns
(Galbraith, 1995). For the airline industry or
more broadly speaking the travel industry, the
question becomes who in the value chain is best
able to assume this role. To a limited extent, the
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travel agent once performed the role of
integrator, but this role has been undermined by
cuts in commission fees, internet access, and
other direct marketing efforts. Conceivably, a
firm or group of firms could assume this role,
adding value to customers by packaging multi
modal transportation with accommodations,
vacation packages, etc.
Theoretically, the idea of a “virtual airline” that
outsources aircraft, cockpit/cabin crew,
engineering and maintenance, ground handling,
accounting, and reservations is appealing
(International Civil Aviation Organization,
1997). This would allow the virtual airline to
escape two factors that tend to plague the
industry during economic downturns—over
capacity and high labor costs. The virtual airline
would possess the flexibility to reduce both labor
and fleet quickly. The practical details of the
virtual airline are more perplexing. On a small
scale, the concept appears workable, but
envisioning a virtual airline the size of American
Airlines is difficult. It is also difficult to envision
how a traditional airline like American could
make the shift to virtual. For example, a shift to
outsourced fleet and crew would likely have to be
gradual and would incur the opposition of
existing labor unions who might well be
prepared to take labor action to prevent the
shift.
MANAGERIAL IMPLICATIONS
The international aviation industry is clearly at
a crossroads. While the industry and the govern
ments who regulate it might be tempted to fall
back into the familiar highly regulated days of
the past, it is doubtful that we will see a
complete reversal if for no other reason than
customer dissatisfaction. Airline managers,
government officials, and the industries that
support aviation need to begin planning for this
“brave new world.” The key unknown in these
calculations is the timeframe. Change is not
something that individuals or firms tend to
embrace gladly, so it is likely that the industry
will seek to draw out the transition to something
like a TCAA on the argument that firms need

time to make the structural adjustments
necessary. A similar argument was made for
NAFTA phase-in. For the near term, scenario
two seems most likely to succeed in some form.
The rationale again stems from the fact that this
change is more of an extension of what went
before than the decoupling of the industry that
would represent a dramatic shift in mindset,
core competency, and basic industry givens.
A number of questions remain unresolved in the
decoupled scenario that makes it difficult to
determine its viability or establish any timeframe for implementation. First, it is unclear
how and/or why firms might choose a given
decoupled segment from a value and profitability
perspective. As stated earlier, the two areas that
have generally been cited as preventing the
industry from achieving long-term profitability
are overcapacity and labor problems. Individual
airlines in good times tend to add aircraft to
their fleet. Then, the inevitable bad times occur
and the overall industry is faced with
overcapacity. Individual carriers with new,
expensive fleets tend to attempt to lower prices
to fill seats cutting into margins and triggering
price wars. It is unclear how a decoupled fleet
management firm would derive long-term
profits. There are likely to be some “economies”
to exploit and it is possible to compensate for
regional downturns by shifting fleets, but a
global downturn like the post-9/11 environment
would seem to put such firms at high risk. The
issue becomes—What type of firm would seek to
fill this decoupled niche? Some firm must do so
to make the overall system work. In regard to
the second factor affecting long-term
profitability, there are examples of firms
outsourcing maintenance. There are clearly
“economies” to be gained by consolidating
maintenance. It also would be possible to
outsource flight attendants. However, the key
labor group has always been pilots. In bad
times, they have given up wage/working
conditions to aid firms, but these concessions
have been the target of immediate concern when
profits return. Any scenario that threatens this
group is a likely to stir rapid reaction. When the
idea of using flight crews from lower wage

alliance partners was floated, unions were quick
to form inter-alliance union groups to block these
efforts (Gill, 1998). Even the reservation/yield
management systems a la Sabre that have often
been viewed as a key source of advantage in the
industry have come under criticism for creating
complex pricing schemes that drive away
customers, particularly the high margin business
travelers that support the much larger low fare
passengers. This is not to say that it is not
possible to develop a business model for
decoupled segments that would be capable of
attracting investment, but it is an elusive
possibility.
Under Scenario Two, the international carriers
would restructure their routes and fleets toward
the international long haul market leaving the
domestic markets to short-haul, lower cost
carriers that would feed international hubs
either because of market forces or marketing
agreements with the international carriers. This
would be more of an adjustment of U.S. carriers
than those in Europe where the flag carriers
have primarily focused on international routes.
Competition between individual carriers in a
TCAA would focus on several key areas: cost and
fare structure, service quality, and route
structure/access. In a study of cost competitive
ness among international carriers, Oum and Yu
(1997) found that U.S. carriers are more cost
competitive than all but a small number of Asian
carriers that benefit from lower labor costs. This
allows U.S. carriers to offer lower fares and still
make a profit. On the other hand, U.S. carriers
are rarely rated highly in surveys of
international service quality (Zagat, 1992). It is
less clear how consumers in an open aviation
market would make the tradeoff between price
and service quality.
CONCLUSION
Air transportation is a critical link in the global
system. It has been an enabling factor in a
process of globalization that has witnessed the
fall of most tariff barriers, the establishment of
the World Trade Organization, and the
integration of many national economies into
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broader trading associations.
Yet, air
transportation itself has only reluctantly been
dragged along the path to liberalization. The
events of September 11th can either jumpstart a
new era of liberal air transportation or stall

recent efforts to achieve liberalization. The
United States can lead air transport liberaliza
tion as it has led other efforts to open markets
and economies but only by taking certain risks
with its own air transportation system.
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EXAMINING SOURCES OF
DRIVER TURNOVER FROM A
MANAGERIAL PERSPECTIVE
Hokey Min
University of Louisville

ABSTRACT
There is growing concern about the declining profitability of the U. S. trucking industry. Such
concerns often stem from the increased difficulty of recruiting and retaining qualified drivers.
In fact, the trucking industry has been hit hard by shortages of qualified truck drivers over
the last two decades. To cope with this chronic problem, trucking firms have attempted to
formulate various driver recruitment and retention strategies that include pay raises,
bonuses, equipment improvement, and adjustments in working hours. This article provides
trucking firms with the means to implement a more effective driver recruitment and retention
strategy by examining sources of the driver shortage problem.

INTRODUCTION
Despite the recent downturn of the U.S.
economy, many trucking firms are still
experiencing difficulty in recruiting and
retaining qualified drivers. Over the past two
decades, the trucking industry has been hit hard
by a shortage of truck drivers. For instance,
between 1992 and 1999, employment within the
trucking industry grew much faster (31.10%)
than the total employment growth (18.75%) of
the United States (Bureau of Labor Statistics
1999). However, despite faster job growth, the
trucking industry experienced unusually high
turnover rates. In 1992, for-hire truckload
carriers often had 100 to 200% annual driver
turnover rates, whereas the median employee
turnover in the U.S. was 8.4% (Overdrive 1997).

Driver turnover has already undermined the
profitability of the trucking industry by causing
increases in training cost, equipment idle time,
and service disruptions. Pressured with chronic
driver turnover and mounting fuel costs, some
trucking firms such as J. B. Hunt, Schneider
National, Yellow Freight Systems, Consolidated
Freightways, Roadway Express, and Swift
Transportation have raised their freight rates by
5 to 10% or more (Machalaba 1999). Indeed,
freight rates are rising as evidenced by a 10%
increase in intercity trucking costs and an 8%
increase in local trucking costs (Minahan 1998).
While the industry increases its efforts to control
trucking costs, there is little sign of improve
ment. The key to substantial productivity gains
in the trucking industry is maintaining a steady
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workforce. According to the Trucking Economic
Review (Costello 1999), truckload (TL) carriers
reported an average of 103% driver turnover rate
in late 1999, while smaller carriers reported an
average driver turnover rate of 92%. Such a
high turnover may be due to an unprecedented
demand for trucking services, slow growth in the
qualified labor force, tougher federal safety
regulations, and poor human resource
management. Considering the significance of
trucking to logistics productivity, a high driver
turnover rate and driver shortage could cripple
the U.S. economy. In 1998, trucking accounted
for 86% of the total freight bill in the U.S. and
the trucking industry grew by more than $24
billion (Schulz 1998). By 1999, the trucking
industry employed more than 3.1 million truck
drivers, an increase of 66% over the 1980 driver
employment figure (Wilson 2001). By 2006, the
trucking industry is projected to generate $446.2
billion in revenues (ATA Logistics Council 1998).
Therefore, there is a growing need to formulate
viable driver recruitment and retention strate
gies to alleviate the ongoing driver shortage
problem.
Various attempts have been made to address the
driver shortage problem. Many trucking firms
such as J. B. Hunt, Boyd Brothers, Contract
Freighters Inc. (CFI), and O & S Trucking
boosted driver pay to reduce driver turnover.
Between 1997 and 1998, 80% of the top 100
carriers increased driver wages by an average of
10% (Moore 1999). On the other hand, Celadon
Trucking and Cargo Transporters began to
reward drivers for their longevity. U.S. Xpress
Enterprises, Interstate Worldwide Relocation,
and Consolidated Freightways introduced bonus
programs for drivers with safe driving records.
Reflecting a driver’s desire for new and more
comfortable equipment, Boyd Brothers reduced
its equipment replacement cycles from 42-48
months to 36-40 months (Moore 1997). C. R.
England & Sons beefed up its driver training
program by investing $6 million in a state-of-theart driver training center (Kahaner 1998). Other
driver recruitment and retention strategies
include a sign-on bonus, profit sharing, flexible
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driving schedules, driver recognition, career
advancement opportunities, and a reduction in
non-driving activities. Although all of these have
potential merits, the effectiveness of these
strategies is not necessarily verified by the
existing literature. This article moves beyond
the scope of the existing literature by identifying
the primary causes of driver turnover and
suggests viable driver recruitment and retention
strategies.
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
To examine the causes of high driver turnover, a
four-page questionnaire was mailed in November
of 1999 to approximately 3,000 randomly
selected trucking firms listed in the National
Motor Carrier Directory (1999)and located in the
Midwest (Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Missouri) and
South (Kentucky, Tennessee, Georgia). To
increase variability in the data and generality of
the survey results, various sectors of the
trucking industry were represented in the
sample.
These industries include regional
truckload (TL) carriers (33.5% of the responding
firms), national TL carriers (21.8%), both
national less-than-truckload (LTL) and TL
carriers (11.4%), both regional LTL and TL
carriers (8.7%), regional LTL carriers (6.1%),
national LTL carriers (1.9%), and others (16.5%).
Of the 3,000 questionnaires, 422 valid responses
were received and 16 were returned as
undeliverable. This produced a response rate of
14.14%. A response rate below 20% for a mail
survey is not uncommon in the logistics
literature (e.g., Mentzer et al. 1992; Murphy and
Daley 1994; Pedersen and Gray 1998; Sum et al.
2001). To avoid potential non-response errors, a
series of tests for non-response bias were
conducted by comparing early responses with
late responses in terms of item response.
Results of the comparison of early and late
responses indicated that there were no
statistically significant differences in group
mean scores for the two waves of samples at a =
0.05 on any of the item responses. Therefore,
non-response bias was not a concern.

The questionnaire contained various questions
related to the size and sales volume of the
responding firms, annual driver turnover rate,
driver profiles, the relative importance of driver
incentives to driver recruitment and retention,
and the potential causes of driver shortages. The
Statistical Package for the Social Sciences
(SPSS) for Windows (2000) was used to analyze
the data collected from the sample.
The annual sales volume of the majority of
responding firms (95.8%) does not exceed $50
million. Most of the responding firms (76.7%)
had less than 50 full-time drivers; 97.6 percent
had less than 500. Ninety-one percent said that
their part-time drivers comprise less than 10% of
total drivers. A vast majority of these drivers
are non-unionized (93.1%), more than 30 years
old (92%), and have more than five years of
driving experience (86.7%). However, almost
two-thirds of the responding firms (65.2%) said
that their drivers have been with their firms for
fewer than five years. In other words, many
firms are lacking tenured drivers. This pattern
also implies the common occurrence of driver
“churning” (moving from one firm to another). A
majority of respondents (61.6%) reported an
annual voluntary driver turnover rate greater
than 10% in 1998.
Four percent of the
responding firms experienced severe driver
turnover exceeding 100%.
HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT
The Effects of Organizational
Characteristics on Driver Turnover
Gooley (1997) indicated that TL carriers, which
offer long-haul, irregular route services, would
experience a greater difficulty in recruiting and
retaining drivers than LTL carriers. The
rationale was that TL carrier drivers were more
likely to be on the road longer and have less
predictable job assignments than drivers of the
LTL carriers. In fact, driver turnover rates in
the TL segment have been reported as high as
300%, far exceeding the industry average of
about 100% (Bearth 1999). Therefore, it was
assumed that drivers of TL carriers are less

likely to stay with their jobs than drivers of LTL
carriers.
H1:

A significant correlation exists between
driver turnover and the type of carrier for
which a driver works.

In general, organizational size is positively
correlated with group stability (Caplowl957).
The rationale is that a large firm tends to have
greater financial resources and stronger market
position, providing a greater degree of stability
than a small firm. Indeed, Chapin (1935)
discovered that employee turnover decreased
sharply with increasing firm size. On the other
hand, LeMay et al. (1993) found in their survey
of TL irregular route carriers, that larger firms
had a higher percentage of driver turnover than
smaller firms, because the latter might pay more
personal attention to drivers and create a more
open dialogue than the former. These facts lead
to the following hypothesis.
H2:

A significant positive relationship exists
between driver turnover and the size of
the trucking firm for which a driver
works.

The Effects of Driver Profiles on Driver
Turnover
Beilock and Capelle (1990) discovered that
drivers of certain age groups (in their 50’s or
20’s) were more likely to quit driving than those
in their 30’s and 40’s. Younger drivers tend to
have smaller opportunity costs for changing their
jobs or careers due to having a greater number of
career alternatives than their older counterparts.
On the other hand, older drivers may leave their
professions to retire.
H3:

A significant negative relationship exists
between driver turnover and driver age.

More experienced drivers are expected to earn
more than less experienced drivers due to their
increased skill level. Thus, those with longer
years of driving experience are less likely to
leave their current jobs than those with fewer
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years of driving experience. Considering the risk
aversion nature of human behavior, a driver’s
years of experience are presumed to influence
driver turnover.
H4:

A significant negative relationship exists
between driver turnover and a driver’s
experience.

The “Driver Survey” conducted by Gallup (1997)
demonstrated that the steadiness of the driver’s
work is the most important indicator of driver
satisfaction. The greater the driver satisfaction,
the less likely a driver is to leave his/her current
position. Keller (2002) also observed that the
longer a driver was with the firm, the more
familiar he/she may be with the dispatcher,
operation, service requirement, and customers.
Thus, the longer a driver is with a firm, the more
likely he/she will stay with the firm.
H5:

A significant negative relationship exists
between driver turnover and a driver’s
tenure with the trucking firm.

Beilock and Capelle (1990) found a strong
relationship between a driver’s income and
his/her occupational change intention. Similarly,
Keller (2002) discovered that increased driver
pay is significantly associated with reduced
driver turnover. Drivers with lower monetary
compensation are more likely to leave their jobs
than those with higher monetary compensation.
Higher driver salary should provide a significant
incentive for job stability and reduce driver
turnover.
H6:

A significant negative relationship exists
between driver turnover and a driver’s
starting salary.

satisfaction and turnover. Steadiness of the
work, in turn, often correlates with job security.
In fact, Ashford et al. (1989) suggested that the
lack of job security will diminish the employee’s
sense of attachment and responsibility to the
organization and increase turnover. Thus, the
trucking firm which emphasizes the importance
of job security to its driver retention program is
likely to experience low driver turnover.
H7:

The firm that tends to stress job security
sustains low driver turnover.

Drivers will be more satisfied with their jobs
when there are greater advancement oppor
tunities (Wiggins 1990). Similarly, Barnes (1999)
reported that a diverse career path with
advancement opportunities would improve driver
retention. Therefore, the trucking firm that
provides advancement opportunities should have
lower driver turnover.
H8:

The firm that tends to stress advance
ment opportunity sustains low driver
turnover.

Fringe benefits, such as healthcare benefits, are
tangible inducements that are found to positively
influence an employee’s decision to stay with
his/her current job (Buchko 1992; Shaw et al.
1998). In other words, fringe benefits increase a
driver’s financial reward and make his/her
current job more attractive. The projection that
healthcare costs, such as hospital and doctor
fees, will go up by 35% to 40% in 2002 could
make fringe benefits a determining factor in
retaining a driver (Bearth 2001). Thus, the
trucking firm that recognizes the importance of
fringe benefits to driver retention is likely to
experience low driver turnover.

The Effect of the Trucking Firm’s
Incentives on Driver Turnover

H9:

In general, an increase in driver satisfaction
leads to less driver turnover. Brandt (1997)
indicated that the steadiness of the work was
one of the most important predictors of driver job

One thing that drivers wanted more than
anything else was to be home for important
family events (Kahaner 1997). Dobie et al.
(1998) also indicated that the driver’s time spent
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The firm that tends to stress fringe
benefits sustains low driver turnover.

on the road represented one of the most
important incentives for driver satisfaction. This
leads to the following hypothesis.
H10:

The firm that attempts to minimize the
driver’s time spent on the road sustains
low driver turnover.

Many firms believe that by improving working
conditions of drivers, satisfaction and loyalty can
be increased. According to a driver survey
conducted by the Upper Great Lakes Transporta
tion Institute, one of four reasons why the
surveyed drivers chose a particular trucking firm
was better fleet equipment (Fleet Equipment
1999). Since poor equipment can translate into
less comfort, operational difficulty, frequent
breakdown, and reduced safety, the condition of
the equipment influences the level of driver
satisfaction and subsequent turnover. Indeed,
some earlier studies (Deierlein 1996; Taylor and
Cosenza 1998) discovered that driver satisfaction
is affected by the newness and comfort of the
truck.
Reflecting drivers’ concerns over the
condition of the equipment, some firms such as
U.S. Xpress, Trucks for You, and Mary B. Turner
Trucking have begun to select new trucks based
upon drivers’ input (Fleet Equipment 1999).
Such an effort may have contributed to the
reduced life cycle of trucks and the growing
popularity of aerodynamic long-nose trucks
equipped with built-in satellite communication
systems. Thus, we posit that the trucking firm,
which recognizes the importance of the condition
of trucking equipment to driver retention, is
likely to sustain low driver turnover.
Hn:

The firm that provides better equipment
sustains low driver turnover.

HYPOTHESIS TESTING AND RESULTS
To examine whether there is a significant
relationship between the type of carrier (LTL
regional carrier; TL regional carrier; LTL
national carrier; TL national carrier; both
regional LTL and TL carrier; both national LTL
and TL carrier) and four different categories of

driver turnover (1-10%; 11-50%; 51-100%; 100%
or higher), the Chi-square test was used. The
Pearson chi-square value of 24.938 (p-value =
.127) does not support Hj at a = .05. Thus, it is
concluded that driver turnover does not vary
significantly by type of carrier.
Two separate tests were performed to examine
the correlation between the size of the trucking
firm (both in terms of annual sales volume and
number of drivers) and its driver turnover. Test
results strongly support H2.
A significant
relationship was found between the size of the
trucking firm with respect to its sales volume
and driver turnover at a = .05 (Pearson Chisquare value = 33.017, p-value = .001). A
significant relationship was also found between
the size of the trucking firm with respect to its
number of drivers and driver turnover (Pearson
Chi-square value = 52.629, p-value = .000). In
particular, a cross-tabulation between the firm
size and the turnover rate indicates that small
trucking firms, with less than a $25 million
annual sales volume, are likely to maintain
relatively low driver turnover rates (less than
50%). Similarly, small trucking firms, with less
than 50 drivers, tend to maintain relatively low
driver turnover rates of less than 10%.
The result of a Chi-square test does not support
H3 (Pearson Chi-square value = 19.525, p-value
= .191), indicating that there is no correlation
between driver age and turnover. On the other
hand, the test result (Chi-square value = 38.648,
p-value = .000) reveals that a driver’s experience
significantly influences driver turnover.
In
particular, a cross-tabulation between the
driver’s experience and driver turnover shows
that drivers who have less than five years of
driving experience will be more likely to
experience turnover, while drivers with more
than ten years of driving experience will be more
likely to remain with the same trucking firm.
By the same token, the test result (Chi-square
value = 59.764, p-value = .000) supports H5 at a
= .05. A significant relationship was found
between a driver’s length of tenure and driver
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turnover. More specifically, drivers who stayed
with the same firm more than five years are less
likely to change jobs.
Surprisingly, the test result (Chi-square value =
6.884, p-value = .649) does not support H6 at a =
.05. No correlation appears to exist between a
driver’s starting salary and driver turnover.
This test implied that a monetary incentive was
not an effective inducement for driver recruit
ment and retention. Although this finding defies
the common belief that high monetary compen
sation increases driver satisfaction and thereby
reduces turnover, it is somewhat consistent with
the study result of Richard et al. (1995) which
evidenced that low pay was not necessarily a
primary cause of driver turnover.
A simple t-test was performed to determine if the
low turnover firm (less than 50% annual
turnover rate) stressed the importance of job
security to driver retention more than the high
turnover firm (greater than 50% annual turnover
rate). The test result (p-value = .000) supports
H7 at a = .05. This suggests that a trucking
firm’s ability to sustain a low turnover rate can
be increased by placing emphasis on job security.
On the other hand, a similar t-test result ipvalue = .761) rejects H8 at a = .05. The data do
not support the notion that the low turnover firm
recognized the importance of advancement
opportunity to driver retention more than the
high turnover firm.
Furthermore, H9 (p-value = .092), H10 (p-value =
.089) and Hn (p-value = .066) were rejected at a
= .05. There was no significant difference
between low turnover and high turnover firms
with respect to perceived importance of fringe
benefits, amount of time on the road, and
condition of equipment to driver retention. In
this sample, advancement opportunity, fringe
benefits, time spent on the road, and condition of
the equipment did not prevent drivers from
leaving their current jobs.
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FINDINGS AND IMPLICATIONS
First, the surveyed firms do not regard
competitive pay scales as a critical attribute for
driver recruitment and retention. In other
words, they tend to believe that monetary
incentives are not necessarily an integral part of
building a good relationship with their drivers.
This finding contradicts the report of J. B. Hunt,
which indicated that substantial pay raises
reduced turnover rates significantly and
attracted more experienced drivers (Schulz
1997). A study by the Gallup Organization (1997)
reported that the majority (about 80%) of the
driver shortage problem is the result of driver
churning (moving from one company to another
with the same pay). This implies that pay hikes
alone cannot make drivers happy. Instead, job
security has been found to influence drivers to
stay with the same firm. This finding is
congruent with a recent report indicating that
today’s drivers are putting more emphasis on job
security than salary as a result of the slow
economy and the subsequent increase in layoffs
(Armour 2002).
Second, a driver’s experience and tenure with
the same trucking firm have been found to
influence driver turnover, whereas driver age
has no bearing on turnover. This finding makes
sense, in that the more experienced a driver is
and/or the longer the driver stays with the same
firm, the greater sacrifice he/she is likely to take.
In other words, a driver with more experience or
longer tenure tends to think that the expected
utility of his/her current job is greater than that
of the alternatives. In particular, drivers with
more than ten years of driving experience or who
have worked for the same firm for more than five
years have a greater tendency to stay with the
same firm and profession than their counter
parts.
This implies that recruitment and
retention strategies should be designed in
accordance with its driver profiles. Perhaps the
best strategy to cope with driver shortages is to

place a greater emphasis on job stability rather
than providing drivers with short-term monetary
rewards, fringe benefits, and better equipment.
Finally, defying common sense, the size of the
trucking firm adversely affected driver turnover.
Larger trucking firms tended to have higher
driver turnover rates than their smaller
counterparts, despite the fact that the former
may be better positioned to provide drivers with
greater financial stability than smaller firms.
The rationale is that smaller firms may pay more
personalized attention to drivers and be better
positioned to maintain a solid driver-dispatcher
relationship than larger firms. Thus, trucking
firms should treat drivers as “internal cus
tomers” who need constant personal care.
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APPENDIX A
SUMMARY OF HYPOTHESES TESTING

Hypothesis

Result

Organizational Characteristics

H,:

A significant correlation exists between driver turnover and the type of carrier
with which a driver works.

Not Supported

H2:

A significant positive relationship exists between driver turnover and the size
of the trucking firm for which a driver works.

Supported

Driver Profiles

H3:

A significant negative relationship exists between driver turnover and driver
age.

Not Supported

H»:

A significant negative relationship exists between driver turnover and a
driver’s experience.

Supported

H5:

A significant negative relationship exists between driver turnover and a
driver’s tenure with the same trucking firm.

Supported

H6:

A significant negative relationship exists between driver turnover and a
driver’s starting salary.

Not Supported

Incentives

Hv:

The firm that tends to stress job security sustains low driver turnover.

Supported

H8:

The firm that tends to stress advancement opportunity sustains low driver
turnover.

Not Supported

H9:

The firm that tends to stress fringe benefits sustains low driver turnover.

Not Supported

Hio:

The firm that attempts to minimize the driver’s time spent on the road
sustains low driver turnover.

Not Supported

Hn:

The firm that provides better equipment sustains low driver turnover.

Not Supported
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MANUSCRIPT SAMPLE
TEACHING LOGISTICS STUDENTS TO TAKE OWNERSHIP OF INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE
DEVELOPMENT
Frank W. Davis, University of Tennessee
Kenneth J. Preissler, Logistics Insights Corporation
Logistics systems, developed gradually over the past decades, are undergoing necessary radical change in this era of
increasing global competition. This article describes an approach taken by the authors to teach logistics students
how to take ownership of designing their own information infrastructure and how to use it to make their
organizations more flexible, providing more strategic options.

INTRODUCTION
Advances in information systems technology such as data base management systems, bar code scanning,
telecommunications, and image processing have enabled logistics and information managers with vision to
reengineer the way the firm conducts its business. The usage of mainframe computers, personal computers, and
logistics information systems has been widely studied (Gustin 1989). These studies have universally concluded that
there has been a rapid growth in the usage of computers and logistics information systems.

Computer Usage in the Classroom
The usage of computer applications in a logistics course has also been studied. Rao, Stenger and Wu stated that
there are several approaches to integrating computers into the classroom in a business curriculum, each with its
individual advantages and drawbacks (1992).

Table 1 about here

Systems Development in Practice
The study of the information systems development process of computer applications has been almost universally left
up to the computer science, software engineering, and information systems educators and practitioners.
y = a: - 2ax + x:

(1)
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